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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAWN W. HORNE, ) PETITION FOR 
) WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Plaint iff-Appellant, ) 
vs. ) Case No. 
W. REID HORNE, ) 
Defendant-Respondent. ) 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. In an action for divorce, where property 
settlement provisions are stipulated to, does the court 
abuse its discretion in issuing an order nunc pro tunc when 
the court has found that tax law changes would deprive a 
party of benefits under the stipulation which that party 
would otherwise have received. 
2. Should a stipulation be set aside when it 
appears the parties had no "meeting of the minds", or 
where it appears that one party was fraudulently induced 
to enter into the stipulation. 
OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Plaintiff petitions this court for review by a 
Writ of Certiorari of the judgment of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. The court reversed the decision of Third District 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup who granted a nunc pro tunc order as 
to property settlement provisions of a divorce decree. 
(Home v. Home, 860060-CA [Utah Ct. App. May 18, 1987]). 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to review the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals entered in this matter May 18, 1987, (Petition for 
Rehearing denied June 23, 1987) is vested in the Utah 
Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Const. Art. VIII, Section 4; 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(a) (1987); and R. Utah S. Ct. 
42, 43 and 45. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
(1) Utah Code Annotated §30-4a-l (Supp. 1983): 
Authority of Court. A court having jurisdiction 
may, upon its finding of good cause and giving ot 
such notice as may be ordered, enter an order Nunc 
Pro Tunc in a matter relating to marriage, divorce, 
legal separation or annulment of marriage. 
(2) Rules of Practice in the District Courts and 
Circuit Courts of the State of Utah, Rule 4.5(b): 
Stipulations. No orders, judgments or decrees 
upon stipulation shall be signed or entered unless 
such stipulation is in writing, signed by the 
attorneys of record for the respective parties 
and filed with the clerk, provided that the 
stipulation may be made orally in open court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiff instituted her divorce action on 
February 19, 1980. The trial court bifurcated the proceedings, 
entering an order ot divorce on January 27, 1984 but reserving 
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Facts 
Plaintiff, Dawn w. Home, and Defendant, W. Reid 
Home, were married on January 17, 1970. Plaintiff and 
Defendant each brought substantial premarital assets into 
the marriage. In addition, the parties accumulated substantial 
property during the marriage. Plaintiff filed for divorce 
on February 19, 1980. Trial of the property aspect of the 
case commenced June 19, 1984. During the second day of 
trial the parties reached agreement on the property aspects 
of their divorce which was read into the record in open court 
on the afternoon of June 20, 1984. Each of the parties and 
their respective counsel were present on this occasion. At 
the time this stipulation was read into the records of the 
court, Plaintiff's counsel made the comment that property 
"...will be transferred to (Plaintiff) as an exchange item 
to equalize the marital assets of the parties in this 
matter." (Transcript of June 20, 1984 hearing, page 3.) 
After listening to the terms of the stipulation, the court 
asked each party if they were in agreement therewith. Each 
party responded affirmatively, whereupon the court 
stated "I will approve the stipulation..." (Id. at 12.) 
Plaintiff's attorney then proceeded to prepare 
a written stipulation and order to be signed by the trial 
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court. Upon submission to Detendant1s attorney, the 
documents which had been drafted by Plaintiff's attorney 
were rejected. Defendant's attorney argued that the written 
agreement did not properly state the tax consequences of the 
agreements entered into by the parties on June 20, 1984. 
Counsel were thereafter unable to agree on the terms which 
should be contained in the written stipulation. A hearing 
was therefore scheduled before the court on August 8, 1984, 
wherein counsel were given opportunity to argue their 
respective positions on this dispute. 
Defendant's attorney argued that the stipulation 
entered into on June 20 1984 was intended to give Detendant 
tax benefits under the rules stated in United States v. 
Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962) and subsequent revenue rulings by 
the IRS. (Transcript of August 8f 1984 hearing, pages 
23-25,56-58.) This argument was based solely on the fact 
that Plaintiff's attorney had stated that property was being 
transferred "as an exchange item to equalize marital assets". 
Plaintiff's attorney argued that no such intent existed on 
June 20, 1984. He argued that Plaintiff would never have 
entered into such an agreement as it would involve negative 
tax consequences to Plaintiff. (Rl. at 16, 18, 37, 40-41, 
55 and 61.) 
The court, after listening to the arguments of 
-5-
counsel, held that the June 20, 1984 stipulation was not 
intended to confer tax benefits on Defendant. (Ld. at 
65») The court stated its belief that Plaintiff's use of 
the quoted language was not intended as a "term of art". 
(Id. at 66.) The court further noted that neither party 
specifically discussed tax concerns on June 20, such as 
stepped-up basis, carry-over basis, etc. (I_d. at 67.) 
Finally, the court ruled that it would issue an order nunc 
pro tunc to June 20, 1984, which would contain no reterence 
to tax consequences of the property split between the 
parties. (Id. at 65.) The court's determination to enter its 
order nunc pro tunc was based on a recent change in the tax 
law which would prejudice Plaintiff if the order were not 
issued nunc pro tunc. (Id. at 64.) The nunc pro tunc order 
was signed by the lower court on August 17, 1984. Defendant 
filed his notice of appeal on September 12, 1984. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The entry of a nunc pro tunc order is a 
discretionary matter which should not be overturned in the 
absence of any clear abuse of discretion. There is no clear 
abuse of discretion in this case. 
2. Because an oral agreement was entered into 
in open court on June 20, 1984, and approved by the court, 
judgment was rendered at such time. The court's determination 
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to enter its order nunc pro tunc therefore only made the 
record speak the truth* 
3. There was no exchange whereby Plaintiff 
dropped charges against her original attorney in return for 
entry of the order nunc pro tunc* 
4. Plaintiff should not be bound to a stipulation 
which was entered into fraudulently or under mistake of 
fact or law, 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE ENTRY OF A NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER IS A DISCRETIONARY MATTER 
WHICH SHOULD NOT BE OVERTURNED IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY CLEAR 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION. THERE WAS NO CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
IN THIS MATTER. 
The entry of an order nunc pro tunc is a matter 
committed to the discretion of the trial court, and one 
which should therefore not be interfered with lightly. 
Justice Stewart, in a dissenting opinion in the case ot 
Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1984), indicated 
that Utah Code Annotated §30-4a-l, authorizing the issuance 
of orders nunc pro tunc, "commits broad discretion to 
trial courts in granting nunc pro tunc orders in domestic 
relations matters." It should be noted that though this was 
a dissenting opinion by Justice Stewart, the above statement 
was not contrary to the opinion of the majority, which held 
as it did for other reasons. 
A decision committed to the discretion of the 
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trial court is not to be tampered with on appeal unless 
a clear abuse of discretion is shown. In Peatross v. 
Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281, 
284 (Utah 1976), the court said: 
•..Ordinarily, where the lower tribunal, acting 
within the scope of its authority, has conducted a 
hearing and arrived at a decision, the reviewing 
court...will not interfere with matters of 
discretion or upset the actions of the lower 
tribunal, except upon a showing that the tribunal 
acted in excess of its authority or in a manner 
so clearly outside reason that its action must be 
deemed capricious and arbitrary. 
Likewise, in Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, 
1290 (Utah 1976), the court held: "The judgment of the trial 
court will not be reversed unless it is shown that the 
discretion exercised therein has been abused." 
In determining whether a "clear abuse of discretion" 
has occurred, the relevant question is not what the appeals 
court might have done had they been in the position of 
the trial court. Rather, the question which must be answered 
is whether or not the trial court acted reasonably. As 
stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Peatross, supra, did 
the trial court act ".. in a manner so clearly outside 
reason that its action must be deemed capricious and arbitrary." 
(See also Anderson v. National Carriers, Inc., 727 P.2d 899, 
904 (Kan. 1986), and State v. Anderson, 702 P.2d 481, 
492 (Wash. App. 1985). These cases define an abuse of 
discretion to exist "...only when no reasonable person would 
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take the position adopted by the trial court.") 
Given the above points of law, the only issue 
this court must determine is whether or not it can be 
said that the decision of the trial court to grant an order 
nunc pro tunc was within the realm of reasonability. 
If the decision was reasonable, then there was no abuse 
of discretion and no basis on which to reverse such decision. 
The trial court determined that good cause existed 
to enter its order nunc pro tunc. This finding was based 
on the fact that the oral stipulation of the parties had 
been entered into on June 20, 1984. On July 18, 1984—after 
the stipulation had been entered into, but before a final 
order had been prepared and signed by the Judge—Congress 
changed the tax law in such a way that Plaintiff would 
be required to receive the property to be given to her under 
the property stipulation with a carry-over basis, and, thus, 
suffer negative tax consequences which would not have 
been present on June 20, 1984. On the basis of these 
Tax law prior to July 18, 1984 generally allowed a 
party conveyed property as part of a divorce settlement 
to receive such property with a stepped-up basis. 
Conversely, the party conveying such property was 
taxed for such conveyance on the theory that it was akin 
to a sale or transfer. This general rule was based 
on the case of U.S. v. Davis, supra. Subsequent revenue 
rulings by the IRS granted exceptions to the Davis 
rule if a transfer of property to a spouse was a bona 
fide effort to make the marital assets of the parties 
approximately equal. 
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facts, the trial court found good cause to enter its 
order nunc pro tunc to June 20, 1984. In essence, the court 
felt that it would be unfair to subject Plaintiff to the 
negative tax consequences imposed by the July 18, 1984 Act 
of Congress, when this act was not in existence on the date 
the oral stipulation was entered into. 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused 
its discretion in granting the order nunc pro tunc 
in this matter. Defendant argues that the stipulation 
entered into on June 20 specifically contemplated that 
Plaintiff would receive her share of the property split 
with a carry-over basis. This argument is based on the 
fact that the stipulation of June 20 contained language 
stating that the property given to Plaintiff would be 
as an "exchange item to equalize marital assets". This 
language, Defendant contends, is a term of art requiring 
that Plaintiff receive the property with a carry-over 
basis. (Transcript of August 8, 1984 hearing, pages 23-25, 
56-58.) 
The trial court rejected Defendant's arguments 
on these points. The trial court specifically stated 
its position that the quoted language at the June 20 nearing 
had not been "intended as a term of art". (Id_. at 66.) In 
support of its position, the court noted that at the June 20 
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hearing, there had been "no discussion on the record with 
regard to basis or stepped-up basis or any specific discussions 
on the record with respect to tax consequences." (Ici. at 
67.) Accordingly, the court found that the stipulaton of 
June 20, 1984 had not been entered with intent that Plaintiff 
receive property with a carry-over basis. (IcL at 65.) 
Thus, it would not frustrate the intent of the parties to 
enter a nunc pro tunc order. Rather, a nunc pro tunc order 
would properly effectuate the intent of the parties. 
The rulings of the trial court in the above 
particulars were reasonable. It is reasonable to consider 
the fact, as the trial court did, that there was no explicit 
discussion whatsoever of tax consequences at the time the 
oral stipulation was read into the record. The trial court 
was not unreasonable in concluding that parties who intended 
tax consequences under the exception to the Davis rule would 
make such intent clear. It is not unreasonable, indeed it 
should usually be expected, that parties who contemplate 
tax benefits under the exception to the Davis rule will be 
very careful and explicit in stating such intent both orally 
in court and in written documents submitted to the court. 
The fact that Defendant's attorney was so insistent upon 
explicit language in the written stipulation to be submitted 
to the court is evidence of the reasonableness of this 
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conclusion. (Further evidence of the reasonableness of the 
trial court's ruling can be found in the transcript of the 
August 8, 1984 hearing at pages 23, 25-26, 36, 38, 57, 65 
and 67. The arguments contained on these pages are 
reasonable and support the contention that the Judge's 
determination was reasonable.) 
It simply cannot be said that the court acted 
"clearly outside reason" in this matter. The conclusions 
reached by the trial court were reasonable. The court 
articulated reasonable basis to support its conclusions. 
Being within the realm of reasonability, there has been no 
abuse of discretion, and no basis on which to overturn the 
decision of the trial court. 
II 
JUDGMENT WAS RENDERED JUNE 20, 1984. THE NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER 
TO JUNE 20, 1984 WAS THEREFORE PROPER IN THAT IT ONLY MADE 
THE RECORD SPEAK THE TRUTH. 
Rule 4.5(b) of the Rules of Practice in the 
District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah 
provides that "...orders, judgments or decrees upon stipulation 
shall (not) be signed or entered unless such stipulation is 
in writing...provided that the stipulation may be made 
orally in open court." (Emphasis added.) The implication 
of the latter clause of this rule is that a judgment or 
decree may be entered based on a stipulation made orally in 
open court and approved by the court. That is, a stipulation 
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Ill 
THERE WAS NO "PACKAGE DEAL" WHEREBY PLAINTIFF'S ORIGINAL 
COUNSEL WAS RELIEVED FROM MISCONDUCT CHARGES IN RETURN FOR 
ENTRY OF THE ORDER NUNC PRO TUNC. 
At page 8 of the opinion of the Court of Appeals 
dated May 18, 1987, the court states "...a fair reading of 
the record indicates that in reaching its decision, the 
court improperly considered Plaintiff's offer to drop the 
misconduct charges against her counsel in return for entry 
of the order nunc pro tunc." Careful review of the entire 
record does not substantiate this conclusion reached by the 
Court of Appeals. 
Though Plaintiff did allege misconduct on the part 
of her original counsel, there was no bargain struck 
whereby Plaintiff agreed to dismiss such allegations in 
return for the entry of the order nunc pro tunc. The record 
shows quite clearly that Plaintiff had become dissatisfied 
with her original counsel and sought to obtain new counsel 
to represent her in further proceedings. (Transcript of 
August 8, 1984 hearing, pages 16-20.) The case had proceeded 
to such a point where it was not possible for Plaintiff to 
simply dismiss her original counsel and retain new counsel. 
She therefore alleged misconduct in order that her 
wish to obtain new counsel might be enforced. (I_d. at 
17-20.) However, when the trial court announced its intention 
to enter an order nunc pro tunc, it was apparent that 
Plaintiff had no further need tor representation of counsel, 
-14-
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IV 
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manifest injustice." The court then quoted earlier cases 
stating that stipulations may not be enforced if there 
is a finding that a party's assent thereto was not "informed 
and voluntary". 
Defendant's attorney has admitted that there 
was no meeting of the minds between the parties when this 
stipulation was entered into. At the hearing before the 
Court of Appeals on April 29, 1987, Defendant's attorney 
made several significant admissions regarding this "meeting 
of the minds" issue. There is no transcript of this hearing, 
but references to the revolution number on the tape recording 
of this hearing will be given. 
At revolution 1078 on the tape recording of 
the hearing before the Court of Appeals, Defendant's attorney 
made the following comment: "To be quite frank, I don't 
think until they (Plaintiff and her attorney) got into it 
(the terms of the stipulation) that they realized what the 
tax impact (was) until the deal was done." Later, at 
revolution 1405, the following dialogue takes place between 
the court and Defendant's attorney: 
Court: "You never approved the written order?" 
(Referring to the written order prepared by Plaintiff's 
attorney after the stipulation had been entered into in 
open court.) 
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language. Surely, if Plaintiff's attorney had been informed 
as to the significance of the language on June 20, 1984, the 
issue would have come to a head at that point, rather than 
later when the written stipulation was being prepared. 
Inducing Plaintiff's counsel to include certain tax language 
in the oral stipulation without informing him of the signifi-
cance of the language was fraudulent behavior on the part of 
Defendant's attorney. 
Plaintiff substantiates the statements of Defendant's 
attorney to the effect that there was no meeting of the 
minds. Plaintiff, who represented herself at the hearing 
before the Court of Appeals, discussed the negative tax 
consequences imposed upon her if the court were to accept 
Defendant's argument. She then states "I never would 
have accepted the apartments under those conditions." 
(See again transcript of August 8, 1984 hearing, pages 16, 
18, 37, 40-41, 55 and 61.) 
It is apparent that there was no meeting of the 
minds between either the parties or their counsel when 
the stipulation read into the record on June 20, 1984 was 
entered into. It appears also that there may even be a 
degree of fraud on the part of Defendant and his attorney in 
regards to the June 20 stipulation. Plaintiff should not be 
bound to the stipulation under those circumstances. Such 
-18-
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of a nunc pro tunc order by the trial court was an abuse of 
discretion, and that there was no reasonable basis on 
which to enter such order, this court should remand the 
entire property distribution issue to the trial court 
on the grounds that there was no meeting of the minds 
between the parties when the oral stipulation was entered 
into, and/or Defendant and his attorney fraudulently induced 
Plaintiff and her attorney to enter into the oral stipulation 
on June 20, 1984. 
DATED this 2 3 day of July, 1987. 
BRAUN££RGER, POUI^SEN & BOUD, P.C. 
Robert J. (Poulsen 
Bradley R. Jones 
David A. Wilde 
7/11/87,a6-30,le 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-ooOoo-
DAV7N W. H O R N E , 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
W. REID HORNE, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. D80-668 
REPORTER'S PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT 
June 20, 1984 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP, 
District Court Judge 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
Paul H. Liapis 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & 
LIAPIS 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Richard K. Crandall 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
11th Floor, 10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
GAYLE 5. CAMPBELL 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
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1
 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 1984; 10:00 A, 
2
 -ooOoo-
3 [ [The Court, having conferred with counsel 
and parties off the record, and negotiations having tak( 
5 I place, the following proceedings were held in chambers 
6
 J with counsel and parties present at 3:12 p.m.] 
7 
8 I THE COURT: The attorneys have advised the 
9 Court that they have settled the outstanding issue in 
10 this case; is that correct? 
11 MR. LIAPIS: That's correct, your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Is that right, Mr. Crandail? 
13 I MR. CRANDALL: Yes, I hope so. I think 
we've got it all agreed to, 
15 I THE COURT: Will you state what the agreem 
16 J is on the record, Mr. Liapis? 
MR. LIAPIS: Yes, I would• Let me just 
18
 | locate the checklist here, 
19
 I THE COURT: Plaintiff may have a divorce, 
20
 I final on entry. 
21 | MR. LIAPIS: That has already been entered, 
your Honor. 
23 | THE COURT: That's right. I can't do that. 
24
 J She got one in advance, 
25
 I MR. LIAPIS: With regard to the properties, 
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the plaintiff, Mrs. Home , will be awarded the 
condominium which she's now residing in, the duplexes — 
THE COURT: 
MR. LIAPIS: 
ask that. 
MRS. HORNE: 
THE COURT: 
MR. LIAPIS: 
Where at? 
Well, I knew you were going to 
691 East 4181 South. 
Okay. 
The two duplexes at 1925-27 East 
1700 South and 1933-37 East 1700 South. That's free and j 
clear of any interest of 1 bhe defendant, and subject to 
plaintiff assuming and paying the mortgage payments thereon 
THE COURT: Plaintiff to assume and pay 
mortgage payments? Is that what you said? 
! MR. LIAPIS: 
THE COURT: 
MR. LIAPIS: 
Yes. 
All right, 1 
In addition, the plaintiff will 
be awarded all right, title and interest in and to the 
Townhouse Court apartment 
appliances. Is there any 
MR. HORNE: 
MR. LIAPIS: 
the whole thing. It will 
exchange item to equalize 
in this matter. 
| MR. HORNE: 
complex, together with all of the 
furniture in it? I 
No. j 
Appliances, deposits, rentals, j 
be transferred to her as an 
the marital assets of the parties 
Could I make one point? Could 
i 
i 
Ll 
4 
1 l
 we have a cutoff point as of the first of the mont 
2
 I MR. LIAPIS: What is today? 
3
 | MR. HORNE: It's the 20th. 
MR. LIAPIS: That's fine. Commencinc 
? j the first of July. Is that all right? 
6
 I MRS. HORNE: That's fine. 
7
 MR. LIAPIS: Plaintiff will assume tt 
8
 mortgage payment thereon, taxes commencing with the 
9
 of July through the end of the year. 
10
 I MR. HORNE: The reserve account is se 
at Prudential. 
12
 i MR. LIAPIS: The reserve account like 
13
 I will be transferred. 
MR. HORNE: That will go with it. 
MR. LIAPIS: All right. And there is 
shortage in that reserve account? 
MR. HORNE: No, there's $333 at the f 
of the year that was left over, so — 
MR. LIAPIS: And there have been payro< 
11 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20
 | made? 
21
 I MR. HORNE: It's been made every montt 
22
 ' There should be an overage, not an underage, 
23
 | MR. LIAPIS: In addition, the plaintii 
24
 I be awarded the vacant lot at 6716 13th East as her s 
25
 ' and separate property, free and clear of any interes 
1 : the defendant. 
2 Defendant will be awarded, by way of 
3 properties — let me start at the front. 
4 THE COURT: Awarded all other real property? 
5 MR. LIAPIS: All the rest, which would 
6 include, for the Court's notes, the Suzie-Q Apartments, 
7 the Elm Avenue five-plex, the Townhouse Villa complex, 
8 the Townhouse II complex, the office and warehouse complex, 
9 the Edison property, Snowbird Iron Blosam time share, and 
10 lot 76 of Bloomington Country Club. 
11 Plaintiff will be awarded all right, title 
12 and interest in and to the balloon payment that's part of 
13 the sale of the 4400 South State Street property, including 
14 the monthly payments. 
15 THE COURT: Of how much? 
16 MR. LIAPIS: $160,000 is the principal sum. 
17 THE COURT: Due when? 
18
 MR. LIAPIS: With eleven and a half per cent 
19 interest, I think it was. Due November of 1983. 
20 THE COURT: And what's the property? 
21 MR. LIAPIS: 4400 South State Street. And 
22 that would include the payment of the regular monthly 
23 payments on that balloon of $2,000 a month. 
24 THE COURT: She's just awarded the sellerfs 
25 interest? 
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awarded, in a< 
two Honeywood 
sum of $5,000 
additional $5 
MR. HORNE: That's right. 
MR. LIAPIS: That's correct. And he is 
ddition, the Honeywood Condominiums at -
Condominiums. 
The defendant will pay to plaintiff the 
today, $15,000 cash in ten days, and an 
,000. 
THE COURT: $5,000 today and $15,000 whe 
MR. LIAPIS: Ten days from today. $5,0C 
cash in six months. Okay. 
paid with the 
will maintain 
The June support payment will be conside 
transfer of the $5,000 today. The defen 
the plaintiff as an owner with the defen 
paying the premium on a $100,000 term life insurance 
policy, a reasonable rate policy. 
$100,000 life 
THE COURT: Defendant will maintain a 
insurance policy? 
MR. LIAPIS: With plaintiff to have 
ownership, plaintiff beneficiary. Defendant pays the 
premium. 
of the policy 
THE COURT: Term policy. All right. 
MR. LIAPIS: And he'll give us notificat: 
You'll have to give us the policy. 
Defendant will continue to obtain for the 
plaintiff a new Toyota automobile at wholesale cost, ar 
4 
7 
1
 that's wholesale to the dealer, not to the retailer to the 
2
 public, as long as that privilege is provided to him. 
3
 J That means that she'll pay for the wholesale price, but 
we get the benefit of his benefits. 
5
 The parties agree that if the defendant in 
6
 J any way, shape or form ever returns to an interest in the 
Toyota dealership that's involved in this lawsuit, that 
8
 she'll automatically be awarded one-half interest. 
9
 No alimony to either party. The defendant 
10
 J will, within 60 days or sooner place a new roof on the 
duplex at 1935-37 East 1700 South, at his cost and expense 
12
 | through his workers, 
13
 I THE COURT: At his cost and expense? 
14 
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So plaintiff will pay? 
MR. HORNE: No, defendant will pay. 
MR. LIAPIS: Defendant will pay at no cost 
to the plaintiff. Total cost to the defendant. 
If there are any additional claims for 
attorneys' fees from this action by plaintiff against 
defendant, she will assume and pay the balance. 
THE COURT: What do you mean? Each party 
pay their own fees and costs? 
MR. LIAPIS: After the transfer of those 
cash sums we referred to earlier. 
THE COURT: So each of you pay their own 
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fees and costs? 
MR. LIAPIS: Right. 
THE COURT: Then you can decide between yc 
and the clients who gets it. 
MR. LIAPIS: The parties will each assume 
and pay the debts and obligations against their respecti 
properties that they are receiving, as well as any debts 
which they have incurred in their own name since the 
filing. 
Defendant will further hold us harmless frc 
any tax obligations that result from prior joint filing 
of tax returns, which I think ended with what, 1981? 
MRS. HORNE: 1982 but you haven't actually 
filed but you are going to file that as a joint return? 
MR. HORNE: For 1982 I guess we still can. 
THE COURT: Therefs no filing at this point. 
Each party will execute necessary documents? 
MR. LIAPIS: Yes. 
MR. HORNE: Do we need to spell out that 
exchange, the way we're going to set that up? 
MR. CRANDALL: I don't think so. 
MR. LIAPIS: We're not through. 
THE COURT: The parties are mutually 
restrained from picking on each other. 
MR. LIAPIS: Yes. The defendant will further 
8i 
1 be awarded all his right, title and interest in and to 
2 his business entitled w. R. H o m e , Incorporated. 
3 THE COURT: Each awarded own checking and 
4
 savings account? 
5 I MR. LIAPIS: Bank accounts. That's right. 
6 Each is awarded own retirement, stock plans, et cetera, 
7 if any. Don't you have some retirement benefits at 
8 St. Mark's? 
9 MRS. HORNE: I don't think so. Working 
10 part time, I don't think they provide me with any. 
11 MR. LIAPIS: The plaintiff will be awarded 
12 her 1982 Toyota Cressida automobile. Plaintiff and 
13 defendant are each awarded the furniture in their 
14 possession. 
15 Defendant will be awarded the 30,000 shares 
16 of Challenge Corporation stock, if you still have it. 
17 THE COURT: Defendant awarded? 
18 MR. LIAPIS: Yes. 
19 THE COURT: Each awarded own personal 
20 effects, clothing, and all personal property in possessio 
21 MR. LIAPIS: Also, your Honor, the 
22 defendant has requested a further right of refusal on 
23 any of the properties awarded to the plaintiff if she 
24 should sell, at whatever bona fide offer that she's 
25 received on those properties if and when she puts it for 
sale or puts them for sale. 
A 48-hour time period on that right of 
refusal? 
THE COURT: How much? 
MR. LIAPIS: Forty-eight hours. 
THE COURT: That's not reasonable. 
MR. LIAPIS: Sure it is. No one is going 
to give you an earnest money for more than two or three 
days, at best. 
THE COURT: But if you hit it on a Friday, 
then you ought to have ten days. 
MR. LIAPIS: No one is going to stay on 
an earnest money agreement for ten days. They're going 
give you an offer and expect you to counter it. 
MR. CRANDALL: Well, yes. I think that's 
probably right. Over the weekend we would probably need 
seven days. 
THE COURT: We'll be off the record. 
[Discussion off the record.] 
MR. CRANDALL: We want three business days 
but we'll exclude the condo. 
MR. LIAPIS: Is that all right? 
MRS. HORNE: Yes. 
MR. LIAPIS: Is that all right with you, 
three business days? 
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1
 ' MRS. HORNE: Yes 
2
 | MR. LIAPIS: Your Honor, on the attorneys1 
fees, we may want to spell thai: out 
THE COURT: You are required to be 
5
 reasonable 
6
 I MR. CRANDALL: We have it now that each 
party bears their own attorneys' fees. A large part of 
8
 I this cash settlement is for attorneys' fees, and I may 
9
 I want to examine that from a tax standpoint and change that.! 
We may want to make it payable as alimony. 
MR. LIAPIS: No. 
MR. HORNE: The $ 5 , 0 0 0 i s a l i m o n y . 
1 3
 | MR. L I A P I S : No . 
MR. CRANDALL: $25,000 of it is. 
MR. LIAPIS: $20,000 is. The $5,000 is hers. 
MR. CRANDALL: So $20,000 of it is attorneys' 
fees and costs? Is that the way it is? 
MR. LIAPIS: I think that's the way it was 
19
 intended, 
THE COURT: And it's not denominated as 
alimony, so — 
MR. CRANDALL: No. 
MR. LIAPIS: No. So that's it. Do you 
want to ask them if they agree to that? 
THE COURT: Is that as you understand it? 
11 
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MR. CRANDALL: Yes , your Honor . 
MR. HORNE: You've h e a r d e v e r y t h i n g the 
been r e a d i n t o t h e r e c o r d , have you? 
MR. HORNE: J u s t a s l ong a s I g e t my s^ 
I a g r e e 
THE COURT: Do you understand it? 
MR. HORNE: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: And you agree to be bound 
thereby? 
MR. HORNE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mrs. Home, you have heard v« 
been read into the record? 
MRS. HORNE: Yes. 
THE COURT: And you understand it? 
MRS. HORNE: Yes. 
THE COURT: You agree to be bound thereby 
MRS. HORNE: Yes. 
THE COURT: I will approve the 
stipulation of settlement. Will you draft it? 
MR. LIAPIS: Yes. Thank you, your Honor. 
[Whereupon, at the hour of 3:32 p.m., the 
proceedings were concluded.] 
-ooOoo-
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ] 
] ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ] 
I, GAYLE B. CAMPBELL, an Official Reporter 
of the District Court for the State of Utah, County of 
Salt Lake, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages, 
1 through 12, inclusive, comprise a full, true, and 
correct transcript of the testimony given and the 
proceedings had upon the hearing of the above-entitled 
action on June 20, 1984, and that said transcript contains 
all of the evidence, all of the objections of counsel and 
rulings of the court, and all matters to which the same 
relate. 
DATED this day of July 1984, 
GAYLE B. CAMPBELL, CSR 
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IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
- o o O o o -
DAWN W. HORNE, 
v s . 
W. REID HORNE, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
D e f e n d a n t . 
H Dixon HiQrikjy. Cierk 3PJ Oist. Court 
Py Or frO^V^ 
1
 j Deputy Clerk 
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REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
August 8, 1984 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP 
District Court Judge 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiff; 
For the Defendant: 
Paul H. Liapis 
Arnold Richer 
Frank Gustin 
Kent Kasting 
John Adams 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
-and-
Douglas B. Wade 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 900 Valley Tower Building 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Richard K. Crandall 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floojr 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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CtarirtED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH ^ 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; WEDNESDAY; AUGUST 8, 1984; 2:00 P.M. 
-ooOoo-
THE COURT: This is the time and place set 
for the hearing of the various motions in the matter of 
Dawn W. Home v. W. Reid Home, D-80-668. May we have 
your appearances for the record, please. 
MR. LIAPIS: Your Honor, Paul Liapis and 
Arnold Richer, Grank Gustin and Kent Kasting with regard 
to plaintiff, Dawn W. Home. Also, Mr. Kasting and 
Mr. Gustin appearing — 
THE COURT: Why did you leave Mr. Adams out? 
MR. LIAPIS: I'm sorry. Also Mr. Adams. 
The latter three, Mr. Adams, Gustin and Mr. Kasting, are 
also appearing in regards to the motion and notice of 
hearing filed by Douglas B. Wade. 
MR. CRANDALL: Richard Crandall for the 
defendant, your Honor. 
MR. WADE: Douglas B. Wade for Dawn Home, 
the plaintiff. 
THE COURT: I suppose the logical order of 
business would be to proceed on Mr. Wade's motion. 
MR. LIAPIS: Well, I'm not — whatever the 
Court chooses, and it's your pleasure, but it would seem 
that Mr. Wade, not having been present at the time of 
trial, the first day of trial and the second day of trial 
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1 ]
 when the matter was stipulated to and the negotations were 
2
 I had, may not be able to add anything to the merits of that 
3
 J motion if we are substituted, and that's my own concern 
with regards to the plaintiff not being properly 
5
 I represented or appropriately represented because he wasn't 
present to know what happened or what went on. 
7
 | THE COURT: Let's hear his motion to see 
8
 I why he ought to run you out of town on a rail, and then 
9
 I we'll take it from there 
10
 I MR. GUSTIN: I would like to be sure that 
11
 I we have filed a motion to dismiss his motion to substitute | 
counsel, and to know whether that got into the file or 
not. There were two or three grounds that we have that thej 
motion to be admitted as substitute counsel should not be 
allowed. And from a procedural aspect, that might be j 
something the Court would want to entertain first before \ 
we get to his motion. 
THE COURT: It isn't in the file. 
MR. LIAPIS: A courtesy copy was supposedly j 
delivered to you this morning, your Honor 
MR. GUSTIN: Have you got an extra copy, 
22
 j Paul? 
23
 ' THE COURT: I'll send the clerk to go look 
24 MR. LIAPIS: I have a copy of the motion — 
no, I don't have a copy of that. Counsel for the defendant] 
1
 has one, your Honor. 
2
 I MR. GUSTIN: Would the Court desire to hear 
3
 | that motion to dismiss first? 
4
 ' THE COURT: Any objection to that? 
5
 MR. WADE: Let's proceed and handle the 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
issue 
MR. GUSTIN: We111 proceed, your Honor. 
8
 I THE COURT: You may do so. 
9
 MR. GUSTIN: There are two bases to our 
10
 I motion to dismiss the motioti thatfe been filed by Mr. Wade. 
The first motion is that itfs violative of the statute, 
Section 78-51-34, which provides the attorneys in any 
action or special pleading may be changed at any time 
before judgment or final determination as follows: 
Upon his own consent or upon order of the I 
court. ! 
Now, it is our theory, your Honor, that this I 
matter has been finally determined by the court, that ! 
the stipulation that was entered on June 20th on the minute 
entry that was made in accordance with the party stipulatio 
on the record, constituted a final determination of this 
matter. And that under the statute an attorney cannot be 
replaced when there has been a final determination of the 
matter. 
It's only before there has been a final 
M 
1
 determination of the matter, and that as a consequence his 
2 motion to substitute counsel at this point in time is 
3 contrary to the statute. 
4
 With reference to that, we are talking about 
5 when a judgment is rendered or when is the final rendition , 
of a judgment. There has been a change in the husband and ! 
7 I wife section of the Utah Code the last legislative section,i 
8 Section 30-3-5, the words, "when a decree is made," has I 
6 
9 been s t r i c k e n . The word "made" Jl3&Jafig&n»SiJU^ 
10 "when a decree of divorce i s rendered" has been substituted) 
11 as pa r t of the amendment of tlaat s t a tu t e* •*« 
I Mill Mil "***•*• 
—w^j^ff- sac ~i$s8st»am.'z*j * 4 
12 I I have not been able to find any Utah cases 
13 I with reference to |^|3ffi^^ffl|^^^S But in Words and 
14 Phrases is tne indication that "as a judgment is pronounced 
15 in open court, it is rendered, and j&e~GX&&J?an enter it 
in the minutes any time during the 5^$siqii^f court." 
17
 And they draw a distinction between^whgn ^ a^^dg^oat^is •*, * i 
18 
19 
20 
21 
entered and when it is entered of record. And I submit to 
the Court that by the change in the statute, I believe the 
legislature is getting to the point where it is a judgment 
which is being rendered when it is pronounced by the Court,] 
22
 whether it's reduced to writing and signed at that time/* 
23 notwithstanding. And I submit to ^ ^ ^ O T T C H ! ^ . 
24
 of the situation here, the motion to substitute counsel 
25
 I has to be done before judgment or final determination, 
1
 There has been a final determination of this 
2
 matter on June the 20th, and now the motion filed is a 
3
 Johnny-come-lately motion. It's out of order. It's not 
6 
16 
17 
18 
19 
24 
in conformance with the statute and it should be dismissed. 
5
 I The second basis of our motion to dismiss 
is that the motion that's been filed here is slanderous, 
7
 I untrue, and should be stricken in accordance with Rule 11 
8
 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The relevant portion 
9
 of that rule states, your Honor, that "The slanderous or 
10
 indecent matter can be stricken." And I read it in the 
11
 context it is stated in the rule, the signature of any 
12 attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he's read 
13
 the pleadings and that, to the best of his knowledge, 
14
 information, and belief, there is good ground to support 
15
 I it and that it is not interposed for delay. 
If a pleading is not signed — or is signed 
with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be 
stricken as sham and faulty, and the action may proceed 
as though the pleading had not been filed. 
20
 | For a willful violation of this rule an 
21
 I attorney might be subjected to appropriate disciplinary 
22
 I action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or 
23
 I indecent matter is inserted. The motion that's been filed, 
your Honor — 
25
 THE COURT: How would I know that without an 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
and it's found in 55 Pacific Reporter at page 74, an 1898 j 
case. 
In that case a matter had been substantially 
completed and one of the parties moved to substitute 
their attorney. The issue was should the court allow such 
a substitution. The holding of the case is to the effect 
that the court cannot be used as an instrument of fraud to 
do out a person's fee that he's justly entitled to. And 
it states from Mecham in that regard: "The client, however; 
will not be permitted to discharge his attorney without 
cause unless he first pays or secures the attorneys' fees 
and charges, and the court will not enforce substutition 
unless that has been done." 
Now, on that point, your Honor, I call your 
attention to the stipulation that was entered into by the 
parties as it relates and is set forth in the transcript. 
On page 11 of the transcript Mr. Crandall indicates that 
each party is to bear their own attorneys1 fees and says, 
"A large part of this cash settlement is for attorneys' 
fees. I may want to examine that from a tax standpoint and| 
change that. We may want to make it payable as alimony. 
"MR. LIAPIS: No. 
"MR. HORNE: The $5,000 is alimony. 
"MR. LIAPIS: No. 
"MR. CRANDALL: $25,000 of it is. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
24 
25 
1
 evidentiary hearing on the — 
2
 MR. GUSTIN: He has accused the whole firm 
3
 of Gustin, Adams, Kasting & Liapis of sexual harrassment. 
4
 I'm here in behalf of myself today, Mr. John Adams on 
5 behalf of himself, Mr. Kent Kasting on behalf of himself, 
6
 and the other members of the firm would be here if they 
7
 could, but we don't even know this lady. I'm saying that 
8 on its face the motion that's been filed is 
9
 scandalous. It is indecent and it's scandalous and it 
10 does not speak the truth on its face. And for that purpose) 
11 it should be dismissed and taken as if it had not been 
12 filed at all. 
13 Now, there is one other third ground for our 
14 motion. That is not stated in our motion, but it comes 
15 right at the tail end here in terms of what the law is, 
16 J and that is with reference to the protection of an attorney) 
who has appeared in the matter and who has earned their 
just fruits in terms of attorney's fee. I want to say 
that I think, your Honor, this is the reason that this 
motion is filed by Mr. Wade, is none other than to avoid 
21 I the just responsibility of paying an attorney's fee. 
22
 I cite to the Court in this connection an 
23 J old case, but it has been shephardized and there is an 
ALR notation that speaks to the same subject matter, and 
it is Sandburg v. Victor Gold & Silver Mining Company, 
4 
11 
15 
17 
18 
19 
20 
27 
1
 | "MR. LIAPIS: $20 ,000 i s . The $5 ,000 i s 
2 ]
 hers 
3
 | "MR. CRANDALL: So $20,000 of it is attorneys}1 
fees and costs. Is that the way it is? 
5
 I MR. LIAPIS: I think that's the way it was 
6
 intended 
7
 "THE COURT: And it is not denominated as 
8
 alimony and -
9
 "MR. CRANDALL: No 
10 j »MR. LIAPIS: No. So that's it. Do you 
want to ask them if they agree to that? 
12 I "THE COURT: Is that as you understand it? 
13
 "MR. CRANDALL: Yes, your Honor 
14
 j "THE COURT: Mr. Home, you've heard 
everything that's been read into the record, have you? 
16 j "MR. HORNE: Just as long as I get my sword, j 
I agree. 
"THE COURT: Do you understand it? 
"MR. HORNE: Yes, I do. 
"THE COURT: And you agree to be bound 
thereby: 
22
 I , "MR. HORNE: Yes 
23
 I "THE COURT: Mrs. Home, you've heard what's 
24
 I been read into the record? 
25
 I "MRS. HORNE: Yes 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
"THE COURT: And you u n d e r s t a n d i t ? 
"MRS. HORNE: Y e s . 
"THE COURT: Do you agree to be bound 
thereby? 
"MRS. HORNE: Yes. 
"THE COURT: The Court will approve the 
stipulation of settlement. Will you draft it? 
8
 | "MR. LIAPIS: Yes. Thank you, your Honor." 
Now, not only are we third-party beneficiariej: 
of this agreement, but it goes right to the essence of the 
case that I cited to the Court. The attempt here is to 
do us out of a justly earned fee, which is contrary to 
Utah law. And the whole procedure here is contrary to the 
Utah statute. I urge the Court to see the impropriety to 
see what's being attempted in this matter. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Let me just ask you a couple of 
questions, Mr. Gustin. We met at least informally, as I 
recall, or I don't know whether we met or had a conference 
call, but I recall further conversation — I think the 
parties were here — at which Mr. Liapis suggested that 
there was no meeting of the minds and there was a 
misunderstanding and, therefore, we didn't have a final 
determination as you urged earlier. 
MR. GUSTIN: I don't know what that 
conversation was about, but after reviewing the transcript, 
10 
1 I think there was some uncertainty as to what the 
2 transcript said and didn't say, and I think that's what 
3 really everybody has been waiting to have the hearing 
4
 about today, to see what the agreement was, 
5 THE COURT: But the statements of Mr. Liapis 
6
 were that he understood it to be one thing and 
7
 Mr. Crandail and his client said they understand it to 
8 be another thing. 
9 If that's the case and the Court backs off 
10 and relieves them from their so-called understanding, then 
11 do you really have a determination under the statute you 
12 are urging upon the Court? 
13 MR. GUSTIN: I don't suppose we would at 
14 that point, your Honor, if that's the holding of the Court, 
15 However, I think the Court would have to take such steps 
16 as were necessary to protect us on the fees that have 
17
 I been earned to this point. 
THE COURT: Why does the court protect you 18 
19 on fees? 
20 MR. GUSTIN: In allowing substitution of 
21 j counsel, and I assume that that's without good cause and 
22 I it's a sham pleading — 
23 I THE COURT: Don't you still have authority 
24 J under statute to file your attorney's lien and serve it 
on Mr. Crandail and he'll tell Mr. H o m e , "You better hold 
11 
25 
that $20,000 and let those crazy people go and fight about 
it. 
MR. GUSTIN: Well, I think the Court has 
to go a little bit further so that the court is not being 
used as an instrument of fraud. 
THE COURT: But what have you lost by your 
firm being let out if you can immediately file an 
attorneys' lien and they know that they have notice by 
the attorney's lien that you file a claim against all 
proceeds and awards out of the judgment — out of the 
divorce decree? 
MR. GUSTIN: I suppose what we have lost 
is the delay in collecting that money. Now, it's my 
understanding that money has been deposited by Mr. Home 
with Mr. Crandall. There has been substantial performance 
of this agreement, even on the day it was entered, on the 
20th. So to unroll all of those things so that everybody 
is put back in their same position, and Mrs. Home goes 
back to where she was on space one, rather than getting 
the benefits that she has ostensibly received, and 
Mr. Home goes back to space one, we would go back to 
space one and file our lien and probably be adequately 
protected at that point. 
But if the situation is allowed where the 
client gets the benefit of the bargain, and then for some 
12 
17 
18 
19 
20 
25 
1 reason gets out of that portion of the obligation which is 
2 just as much a portion of the obligation as any of them, 
3 then with respect to attorneys' fees we are dealt with 
4
 unjustly. Thank you. 
5 THE COURT: You're ostensibly in a position 
6 of conflict, aren't you, arguingenforceability on one hand 
7
 and that Mrs. Home's express intention for being here is 
8 to try and get out from under the effects of what the other) 
9 side thinks is --
10 MR. GUSTIN: I don't know what position 
11 she's going to take today, but I think Mr. Liapis has 
12 another part of the argument here as to the entry of the 
13 decree as first prepared, nunc pro tunc, which would give 
14 the parties what they bargained for on the 20th day of 
15 June. He will address that issue at the appropriate tir^e, 
16 J I suppose. 
MR. LIAPIS: Your Honor, in that regard, 
may I respond to the concern you have with regard to the 
statement I made and the argument in chambers? I don't 
know if you want to do that before Mr. Wade or after 
21 I Mr. Wade. 
22 THE COURT: Go ahead. Proceed. 
23 MR. LIAPIS: Rich, you can correct me if 
24 J I'm wrong on this. When we delivered the draft of the 
findings, conclusions and decree and the order to 
13 
Mr. Crandall the first time around, he sent them back two 
weeks later and major changes were made, and we tendered 
our version of those to you, then Mr. Crandall then 
tendered his version to you, and we came over at my 
insistence and argued it here and had other conversation 
in chambers. 
The primary purpose for coming over here 
was that you either sign their version, rolling over in 
essence the old capital gains basis, or you sign our 
version giving us the stepped-up basis. 
The comment that was made, and I don!t 
want it misinterpreted, was that if we do not get the 
basis of the stepped-up value on the property, and that's 
not the understanding, then we're not in agreement, 
because we can't ao back and recoup that if we stand 
where we're at. 
Mr. Crandall has a similar argument, but 
I think the two comments were made independently of and 
in a secondary nature, rather than a primary nature. Our 
purpose on that day was to come in here and get the 
findings, conclusions and order signed as we had drafted 
them and we felt we had bargained for. And I think that 
was Mr. Crandall's position also. But it was your 
statement, I believe, that we would definitely need the 
transcript, and that we should wait until that transcript 
1 
1 !
 was prepared and see what the transcript said 
2
 Well, now, the transcript is back and, 
3
 | of course, that's in our second motion. But in talking 
with Mr, Crandall, I think he would agree that there was 
JIBII— T ***"'***- fJJUMJHmkVWIIZ* * * 
5
 I nothing in the transcript that supports their position, 
6
 ' i.e., it is a rollover basis or anything other than a 
stepped-up basis, and the position was that at that time 
4 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
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22 
23 
24 
25 
7 
8 
9
 Our testimony in the appraisals that you 
on the 20th of June, the law of the landj^as Davis, 
•Irian Mniir*-^  - M ^ * - ^ " » - ^ ' .£m*U3mM*.iS.7misram* «E-«Jg5< 
10
 | heard and that she testified to show that Townhouse Court 
at the higher basis than $825,000 value 
4 
11 
I <j. v- U.J.0.V-. i i x ^ i i ^ i X > V ^ L ^ J . ^ ^ " « u y v *. ^  , yywvy v v^ . -i. v-i w • 
12
 I THE COURT: D i d n ' t i t show a f a i r m a r k e t 
13 I value?, 
.«» Wjt. 
MR. LIAPIS: It showed a fair market value, 
but that's where we were coming from and that was our 
position. Of course, we wouldn't do that if we were 
going to take the lower basis. We wouldn't have bargained 
for as much as we did — and if you recall, we were asking 
for another complex, a complex of greater value — and in 
hindsight as well as at that time it wouldn't make sense 
for us to retreat when that complex was $1,600,000 and 
this complex was $825,000. On what basis would we take 
that reduction? 
It had to be there was something in our 
position that would warrant that type of a change, and the 
15 
25 
1 change was the stepped-up basis to give us the depreciated 
2 value to shelter the income. And that's why we went that 
3 way. And if I may pursue it one step further, Mr. Travis 
4
 was here, Mr. Thronsen was here, and they were here for a | 
i 
I 
5 purpose, and they were consulted. They were consulted as i 
6 we were negotiating so that all this was explained to j 
i 
7
 Mrs. H o m e over and over again as we were negotiating. Andj 
8 that was the understanding, and that's why we took the 
9 settlement that we took. And the primary inducement 
10 was that stepped-up bas^is so _she could depreciate the 
11 $125,000. Davis was the law of the land. The fact of the 
12 matter is that, in hindsight, the Tax Reform Act had not 
13 been passed by the Senate, only by the House at that point 
14 in time. We had no expectancy or indication that that 
15 would ever become the law of the land, until after the 
16 fact. 
17
 THE COURT: Mr. Wade? 
18
 MR. WADE: I must admit to being in a bit of 
19
 a difficult position, your Honor. First of all, the 
20 principal issue that we have before us, that before we 
21 can get to the eventual issue of replacing counsel is 
22 this matter of whether we have a final judgment or not. 
23 THE COURT: You clearly don't have a final 
24 j judgment. 
MR. WADE: Okay. If we don't have a final 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
25 
1
 judgment, then I — 
2 THE COURT: I haven't signed anything. 
3 MR. WADE: Well, I make my argument on the 
4
 assumption that we are not going to have a judgment 
5 signed as of the 20th of June or prior to the 1984 Tax 
6
 Reform Act. And basically the argument comes down, very 
7
 simply, to the fact that we've had all kinds of defenses 
8 raised, one of which was the defense that the charge was 
9 against all of the members of the firm. 
10 No, the charge was against the firm. 
11 Mr. Liapis being a member of the firm and actions by him 
12 being actions of the firm, that's where the charges were 
13 being made to. 
14 Basically what it all amounts to is that 
15 Mrs. H o m e , after many, many months of frustration in 
16 J dealing with Mr. Liapis, and constantly in consultation 
with myself with respect to the case and with 
representation and with my encouragement to her to continue! 
with the firm because she was so close to the judgment, 
finally, after the trial and before any judgment had been 
21 | signed, as in fact it has not yet been signed, she came to 
22 I me again and she asked what the law is right now with 
23 I respect to transfers pursuant to a divorce. And I said, 
24 j "Well, the last I'd heard, the '84 reform act was eminent.11 
She called me on the 18th, and the reform act 
17 
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25 
was passed on the 18th. I researched it that day and 
found that indeed it had been passed, and I got back with 
her. She was quite concerned again about whether she 
could continue to confide in Mr. Liapis or have confidence 
in Mr. Liapis's representation of her. At which time I 
did considerable research and in fact got back to her, 
and once again — she's here ready to testify if necessary, 
but I once again told her and recommended to her that she 
stick with the firm of Gustin, Adams, Kasting & Liapis, 
again, because she was so close, at which time she called, 
Liapis and she indicated to Mr. Liapis that the tax H> 
setup was essential to her, the step-up in basis, and that 
"'^•*
M
*
JE H * 
l ^ t S ^ ^ ^ ' ^ o ^ y on -the- property xat&er than^make 00£eY. * 
Mr. Liapis told her that the only way that 
• 
he would go 
if she paid 
bill was 
she 
$7,( 
had 
any 
$35 
back to a trial and fight the issue wo 
the bill that she had 
>,000 r your Honor, and 
could pay that bill. She had 
just been sent. 
there was no 
already paid 
way 
the 
300 in legal fees and her savings, everything s 
just bee 
way pay 
sn depleted to a point 
even 
At 
where she could 
a substantial part of the $35, 
which time she called me back 
,000 
up 
uld be 
That 
that 
firm 
he owned 
not in 
bill. 1 
^»<r.->t !*?»-"***-
and she 
18 | 
1 said, "They are not going to do it unless I pay them the 
2 $35f000. Mr. Liapis has insisted I pay him before he 
3 gets back from his vacation." And that's the first time 
4 that I had any intention of stepping in on the case and 
5 taking it over, and it was just because at that point she • 
6 had no choice but to go to somebody who would pursue the ! 
7 matter, as Mr. Liapis had told her that he would not unless] 
8 she paid the fee that had just been mailed to her. I 
9 In our consultations over the course of the -j 
10 since last August when we first began discussing the case, 
11 she had constantly mentioned several other things, including 
12 promises that he!d made her that he'd never followed 
13 through with, his refusal to follow directions that she 
14 had given him, and worst of all, she has included in her 
15 motion the matter of sexual harrassment. 
i 
16 And basically, even in spite of all those j 
17 claims, she was so encouraged by the time March came j 
I 
lo* around and it looked like she was going to have a trial in j 
19 April and have it over with, that she continued with the * 
f 
20 firm with Paul Liapis representing her. So she continued ' 
21 and kept on until she finally could no longer continue j 
i 
22 with the firm. ' 
23 There is no way, shape or form that this [ 
f 
24 motion to remove counsel is to avoid the attorneys1 fees [ 
25 to the firm. She has every intention of paying to them 
19 
1
 their just fees. We do argue that the fees that were sent 
2 to her were grossly excessive in light of the contract 
3 that she signed with them, but that's another issue 
4
 altogether. But the bottom line is that she continued 
5 with them until she simply could no longer continue with 
6
 them. 
7
 Now, I would like to make a point with 
8 respect to the Code of Professional Responsibility, DR, 
9
 Section 2-110, with respect to mandatory withdrawal of 
10 counsel. 
11 "A lawyer representing a client before a 
12 tribunal, with its permission, if required by its rules, 
13 shall be withdrawn from employment if he is discharged 
14 by his client," 
15 The way I read that is that counsel must 
16 seek discharge and the judge can refuse to discharge them 
17
 J due solely to the fact that it may delay justice, but 
18
 J otherwise the judge has the discretion to grant the 
19
 I original counsel's request for withdrawal or not, but 
20 I that counsel must request withdrawal from the case when 
21 | discharged by his cli.ent. And that's the one thing that 
I don't think has been raised so far today, 
23 I THE COURT: If they do, if this proceeding 
24
 J does result in discharge, how do you intend to proceed on 
your motions where you weren't a party to the settlement 
20 
22 
25 
negotiations or discussions? 
MR. WADE: Well, first of all, I've got an 
agreement with her and with Arnold Richer to where if I 
have a question, he'll help me with the question. 
Second of all, I have familiarity with the 
case and I have got all or most of the documents. They 
still have several documents. I have familiarity with the 
case, however. 
THE COURT: But the settlement discussions 
were oral. 
MR. WADE: Exactly. 
THE COURT: And you weren't a party to any 
of those discussions. 
MR. WADE: I was not a part to those 
discussions, no, and I want to make this very clear, and 
that is, t h a ^ ^ l ^ M ^ e t t J e m ^ i l l r ^ 
f f ; t * >TB "> i f W J f l f * * * , 8 T 
»oneVMrS:maHBKdr«' sSLd 
W*A 'St*taasO!M!k& I Wwm 
Wzpnceriked, *the case^ls*. s e t t l e d because that's.&veryilfeing 
^m^^^^M-^^^d^sisaply r e s t : a^^ftSi^t>61nt,< Does 
21 
1 that answer your question: 
2
 j I THE COURT: Are you taking the position that 
18 
25 
f 
3
 if I don ft address the basis issue specifically in the yfc 
4
 findings and decree — a simple description that the 
5 property -- what complex is it? Is it Townhouse Apartments] 
6
 MR. LIAPIS: Townhouse Court. 
7
 THE COURT: Townhouse Court is conveyed to 
8 her, that by operation of law that means she gets a 
9 stepped-up basis? 
10 MR. WADE: I donft think it's necessary, 
11 your Honor, that you make a ruling that she gets a 
12 stepped-up basis. If the IRS wants to fight, that will 
13 be there to show that this was premarital property, and 
^ " • ^ w * rttum*salk 
14 usually under the Davis rule she would get the step up 
15 in basis. So as long as the order by the Court is 
16 effective prior to the reform act of 1984 — 
17 j M R . LIAPIS: Without stepping on Mr. Wade's 
position, I think that's true and I meant to mention that 
19
 I the Townhouse Court was one of those assets acquired 
20 prior to the marriage. We made that clear to the Court 
21 when we were discussing it in chambers. In fact, when I 
22 and Mr. Richer and Mr.. Crandall came to submit the papers 
23 to you, that was one of the points we raised. It was a 
24 J premarital asset. Her name was not on it and Davis would 
apply. It's a transfer and Mr. H o m e knew that. 
22 
Mrs. Home knew that. Everyone knew that, 
THE COURT: I didn't know that. 
MR. LIAPIS: I'm sorry, but I thought we'd 
told you that that was the one that had been constructed, 
I think, in two phases. 
THE COURT: You told me that when you came 
back in trying to get me to enter the order at the midnight 
hour, and at that point I indicated we better have a 
hearing on what went on in the other room during 
negotiations. 
MR. CRANDALL: 'L Your Honor, regarding the 
trial, I think a lot of misunderstanding is that there 
wasnjt. a -dis.cu5.si0n-about stepped-up basis]!} and that's the 
first time it came out, was in our findings. But what was 
discussed, in my view, anyway, was avoiding the Davis rule. 
The Davis rule is a United States Supreme Court case that 
says that if it's a marital division of property, that's 
a taxable event. And that's all that case says. I think 
counsel agree with that. 
Subsequent to the Davis case there's been 
several Internal Revenue rulings that interpreted ways 
around the Davis case, one of which is 80.59, which states 
that if it's an attempt to equally divide marital assets, 
it is not a taxable event, it is not a Davis case. And 
so we discussed that we were going to avoid Davis. 
23 
1
 The problem is you don't say, "Well, I'm 
2 not going to step up the basis or I am going to step up 
3
 the basis," That's a natural concomitant of avoiding 
4
 Davis. You cannot avoid Davis and also step up the basis 
5 because the tax just disappears into the wind, which is 
6 something that the IRS isn't in the habit of letting you 
7 do. 
8 So if you avoid Davis and it's not a taxable 
9 event, then there's no stepped-up basis. You don't need 
10 to spell it out. If you're avoiding Davis and it's rot a 
11 taxable event, you don't need to take the next step and 
12 say, "Well, you can't step up the basis, because that's 
13 just a natural — flows naturally from avoiding Davis." 
14 In the transcript there is support for our 
15 position. We discussed this informally as well, but in 
16 the transcript on page 3 Mr. Liapis says that "In addition 
1? the plaintiff will be awarded all right, title and interest 
18
 I in and to the Townhouse Court Apartment complex, together 
19 with all the appliances and any furniture*" 
20 Let's see, he says, "Appliances, deposits, 
21 rentals, the whole thing. It will be transferred to her 
22 as an exchange item to equalize the marital assets of the 
23 parties in this matter." 
24 J The language of 59 says an equalization of 
marital assets, if that's what the decree is, then that 
24 
25 
avoids Davis. So I put in the findinqs that this is an 
equalization of marital assets, number one, which doesn't 
mean whether it's acquired before or after, because if it 
was acquired by him before and then he gave her some 
interest in it or she acquired some interest, then it 
can still be a marital asset. If the Court finds it's a 
marital asset, then that's something we can do battle with 
as far as the IRS. 
m If that's in the findings of the Court, whichf 
we put this in, and secondly, that this is an attempt to 
equally divide marital assets and avoid differences, we 
added the additional phrase so there wouldn't be any 
confusion regarding the stepped-up basis, which isn't 
necessary, but we added it.Jf, 
At "that point everything hit the fan. And 
that's exactly what happened. And I think that's the deal.! 
Mr. Liapis indicated that there wasn't a meeting of the 
minds, and now his position has changed, that there is a 
meeting of the minds. £l would suggest there was a meeting 
of the minds and we ought to have the — certainly ought 
to not have the decree entered nunc pro tunc, because that 
further confuses the issue. It may look like we're trying 
t 
to avoid the new law, and I think I'm entitled to a finding 
l 
that says it's a marital asset and it's transferred and > 
this is an attempt to equalize those marital assets.7 
25 
4 
MR. LIAPIS: May I respond? Your Honor, in 
reading page 3 on lines 21 through 24, ^9BmmiiWmBWWmmS^f 
:iiigt:kirg *a little bit more xnzo tmm?3!«H^ 
8if The important language is line 16 through 19 
where it says: "In addition, the plaintiff will be 
awarded all right, title and interest in and to the 
Townhouse complex..." that's where the statement of what 
in fact was agreed to was made. 
As we go on further, it's my question: 
"Is any furniture in it?" 
Mrs. Home said no, and then we go on to 
describe that she gets the appliances, deposits, rentals, 
the whole thing — period. 
For him to say that it equalizes marital 
assets and for Internal Revenue rule, as he says, 80.59 
to apply, it would have to have been said that she and he 
jointly own and have jointly acquired an interest in A 
B, C, D properties and they each have a half interest in 
each of those properties and they each are awarded a half 
interest in those properties. 
But because it is so difficult to get half 
an interest in or a piece of the property to each, we'll 
then give her this and we*11 give him these, and that is 
what you get. And we did say, in all fairness to 
Mr. Crandall's position, that we would try to minimize 
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tax consequences — not as Mr. Crandall indicated, but 
that we would try to avoid Davis, but needless to say, thatj 
is superfluous because we have a premarital property. ___ 
Now, one of the positions the Court had 
indicated all through the trial was that Mr. Home brought 
the nucleus in and he generated this marital estate 
through that nucleus, and I'm not going to give you any 
part of that. That was your comment which, of course, 
was used by counsel in the negotiations. 
Now, he can't sit and argue both sides of 
the fence and say, "I want the best of this bite and I 
want this change over here to exclude him. 
17 
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PMR. CRANDALL: I disagree with Mr. Liapis. 
As far as arguing both sides of the fence, Mr. Liapis is 
doing it now. He's arguing that this was marital property 
before, and now he's saying, well, you said yourself it 
was premarital property. 
What I'm saying is when you settle it you | 
t 
can come in and have a finding that we agreed with the j 
l 
Court and we stipulate that it's marital property, and this) 
is a joint division of marital property. I 
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1 THE COURT: I don't know how we got off the 
2 subject. I think we were talking about kicking Liapis out 
3 of the case and — 
4
 MR. CRANDALL: That's correct, your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: I was simply inviting your 
6 comments as to whether you agreed or disagreed, and here 
7 you are stirring the water up. 
8 MR. CRANDALL: I apologize for that, your 
9 Honor. I'll make one comment on that motion and that is, 
10 that as a practical matter I'm sure that we can tell that 
11 continued representation just won't work. But secondly, 
12 I would take some disagreement, for what it's worth to the 
13 Court, and I feel compelled to make a comment that the 
14 gross lack of attention to her case and negligence is not 
15 consistent with my observation as opposing counsel. 
16 THE COURT: It is not consistent with the 
17 Court's observation either. If you're ever around 
18 Mr. "Mapis, he never gives up easily, never. I don't know 
19 of any case at all, and he's had hundreds of them, where 
20 he rolls over. And he's very vigorous in presenting his 
21 point, and even though he may disagree, he just says, 
22 "Tough beans. That's what my client wants." And so at 
23 every stage he's hung in there. And it was before me for 
24 a number of motions and he was over here badgering me, 
25 calling me on the phone, wanting a motion to bring Crandall 
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1
 in and extract discovery from him and try to get money fronj 
2
 the court to assist him in paying for appraisal fees, 
3
 J And so his representation, once I became acquainted with 
it, has been very vigorous, and he has pressed his case 
5
 I consistently and without let-up 
6
 J And so you are looking at it maybe from the 
perspective of a tax practitioner but from the perspective 
of a judge that hears a lot of divorces, he was not sitting) 
9
 I on his hands, nor was he being casual about it. He was 
10
 I being very aggressive about it 
11
 ' MR, WADE: If the Court please, the source 
of that particular phrase is not directed to the last 
six; .cnths of the proceeding, but rather, she contacted 
Mr. Liapis in March of 1983 and indicated to him that it 
was paramount that this be finished as soon as possible; 
16
 I November at the latest. He assured her that it could be 
17 !
 tinished by September and she, except for an interrogatory 
18 that had been sent out asking for information that she'd 
already given Mr. Liapis, then there's nothing — there's 
no evidence of him having done anything on this case 
21
 [ until December of 1983 
22 [
 And it is certainly the plaintiff's 
23
 I viewpoint that there was gross lack of attention to her 
case. We know that you've got to take the court's trial 
schedule into account, and there was pending and incomplete 
29 
discovery involved, and there was a substantial delay 
that may not be documented by additional discovery 
requests, but I would suspect I might be able to go back 
and find notes as to where I put Mr. Crandall on notice 
several times that 1 wanted the profit and loss statements, 
I wanted certain documents that the court was giving ' 
direction that they ought to be produced on a certain time 
schedule apart from what might have been documented by 
additional formal filed discovery requests. 
If the Court please, I might insert here that] 
it was my impression that at least as of the last six 
months he has been prosecuting the case very vigorously, 
and it was based on that and that alone on which I made 
my recommendation to Mrs. Home on July 19th that she 
continue with the firm of Gustin, Adams, Kasting & Liapis. 
However, since then the relationship has 
just simply fallen apart and there's no way that they can 
continue to fairly represent her. 
THE COURT: You've got to keep in mind that: 
the appraisals, given the property involved, were 
several thousand dollars. And I think from what you've 
said and what I've observed, your client was cash poor 
and couldn't advance those-funds. 
MR. WADE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Lawyers, I think, are in the 
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1
 habit of advancing lots of money for their clients. But 
2 be that as it may, because of the combination of one thing 
3 or another, there weren't those kinds of funds available 
« to ~ 
5 MRS. HORNE: I paid for all of the 
6 appraisals myself. My counsel advanced no costs for the 
7 j appraisers. 
8 MR. WADE: If the Court please, they had an 
9 agreement of $75 an hour, and she had — 
10 MR. GUSTIN: Before we get into that, since 
11 our position at that is just totally not true and the 
12 agreement will speak for itself, I have a suggestion: I 
13 think that from what Counsel has stated here, he's admittec 
14 that his motion to substitute counsel is not true. He 
15 doesn't speak, really, to the facts of the matter, and I 
16 would suggest that it be stricken for purposes of this 
17 hearing today. 
^ If Mr. Liapis was to lose his motion today 
19 to have this entered nunc pro tunc, we'll withdraw as 
20 attorneys in this action. Then commensurate with the 
21 discussion we had earlier, we would protect ourselves the 
22 best way we could some other way on our fee. 
23 In that event, we'll withdraw and Mr. Wade 
24 can appear and he can file his appropriate motion. But I 
25 think that the pleadings that have been filed here today 
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are scandalous, inflammatory, and it should be stricken 
from this record. We should proceed, and if he wants to 
file a decent pleading, if we lose our motion, then hefs 
welcome to have the rest of the case. 
THE COURT: Isn't saying someone is guilty 
I 
of sexual misbeha rior slanderous per se, and don't you havej 
to prove willfulness or malitiousness? 
MR. WADE: We can prove the harrassment underi 
federal law and the Civil Rights Act, your Honor. 
THE COURT: That Gustin, Kastmg, Adams & 
Liapis — 
"Conduct of 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
the f. 
MR. 
represents that f. 
the firm is 
in the hall 
WADE: 
COURT: 
WADE : 
COURT: 
Only 
But 
with respect to Mr. Liapis. i 
your motion — 
The motion is to remove the firm, i 
I understand. But you say, 
irm,,f do you 
WADE: 
irm and, 
Yes. 
not? 
Mr. Liapis is a member. 
therefore, his representation 
conduct of the firm. 
THE COURT: Let me invite you to just go < 
with Mrs. Home and discuss what Mr. Gustin 
suggested as an appropriate solution, to let them urge 
motion about entry of the order nunc pro tunc. 
MR. 
already discussed 
WADE: 
it and 
We are willing to do that. We 
that 
He i 
of 
DUt 
has 
the 
've 
1s exactly what we are willing 
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to do. If they win the nunc pro tunc, then we have 
accomplished everything we wanted. If they lose the 
nunc pro tunc, then that's when we want to step in. 
THE COURT: Is that agreeable, Mrs. Home? 
MRS. HORNE: Yes, it is. 
MR. CRANDALL: I don't want to get in a 
position where a ruling in favor of the nunc pro tunc is 
going to resolve an otherwise sticky problem. I think 
that's unfair to me because I don't think they're entitled 
to a nunc pro tunc order. 
THE COURT: We haven't got that far yet. 
MR. CRANDALL: I just want to make sure that 
I'm not getting myself into that position. 
THE COURT: Why are you? 
MR. CRANDALL: I just don't think that the 
basis of bargaining — I believe that this is a situation 
that we want to get resolved, and what ought to happen is 
that I think the Court ought to make a ruling based on the 
merits of that, and then Mr. Liapis's firm ought to be 
relieved of the furthe responsibility of going forward in 
the case, and in essence I suggest that Mr. Gustin's 
suggestion is a good one. 
I don't think we ought to have this kind of 
pleading in the file, but at the same time I don't want 
that contingent upon a ruling in favor of the nunc pro tunc 
33 
1 motion. In other words, they ought not to be a package 
2 sort of situation. 
3
 sSSI C 9 ^ R 1 : ^Xtfs not a package deaL.^Me^ 
5 flBnriCPIP^^^^ *>line 7f I didn't go out of my office during 
6 your negotiations, and there's one thing that bothers me 
7 a little bit. Mr. Richer and Mr. Liapis will indicate they 
8 had their accountants or appraisers at hand and conferred 
9 with them throughout, which I didn't specifically observe. 
10 I recall at one point one of them came in and sat in, and 
11 I don't know if he was an appraiser or CPA or what the ; 
12 circumstances were, but if they were witnesses or parties i 
13 to what the conversations were in terms of your 
14 understanding of the settlement agreement, I'm wondering 
15 if you're even prepared to go ahead on that motion. ; 
16 MR. LIAPIS: Well, your Honor, referring to j 
17 Mr. Travis, and I think he was the person who did the 
18 evaluations on H o m e Construction Company, off tne top of 
19 my head — well, maybe Mr. Richer can speak to his 
20 qualifications. He valued the business and he was the 
21 person who sat in. 
22 THE COURT: I'm simply asking as to whether 
23 or not he was a party to the negotiations. 
24 MR. LIAPIS: No. Everything was done by 
25 Mr. Crandall and myself. We used Mr. Thronsen and 
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Mr. Travis was here when we were explaining — when I 
would come back from our negotiations and I would 
represent to Mrs. Home what was said. And Mr. Thronsen 
and Mr. Travis were there, and Arnie was there, and we 
would discuss and interpret what was coming from the 
other side and what was being agreed upon. And that's why 
we took Mr. Travis into chambers, to make sure that when 
we read into the record the agreement that it would comportj 
to what we had agreed to. And that's how they were used, 
your Honor. 
MR. CRANDALL: They were not party to any 
discussions with me. 
MR. WADE: I would like to make one comment. 
As I see it, my role here would no longer be essential 
to the discussion between them. The comment that I would 
like to make is that Mrs. Home has indicated to me that 
counsel for defendant, Mr. Crandall, made the statement 
after the settlement that Mr. Home would have to pay 
capital gains tax on that transfer. 
MR. CRANDALL: That is untrue and I deny 
that and would do so under oath. 
MR. WADE: If I may be dismissed to have a 
seat and observe. 
THE COURT: You may. Letrs hear your motion 
then in terms of entry. 
35 
MR. LIAPIS: Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. GUSTIN: Has the pleading that's been 
filed already been stricken? 
THE COURT: I'm holding that in abeyance 
and we'll move on to the next step. 
MR. LIAPIS: Your Honor, the rest of the 
motion was our motion to compel entry of the findings 
that were filed and is a follow-up to the motion that 
Mr. Crandall and I have verbally agreed to have within 
your chambers, Mr. Richer being present. That was for 
the purpose of entering the findings, conclusions, and 
the order as we have prepared them and submitted them to 
you in July, about the 15th or 16th of July, if my memory 
serves me correctly. 
Mr. Crandall submitted, also, his copies, 
as I understand it, and then we came to court and after 
discussion he indicated that the transcript should be 
obtained. Everyone was advised we couldn't have this 
hearing until after the 5th of August and then Mr. Crandall 
evidently set up this hearing with Mr. Richer1s help in 
my absence, and" the purpose was to determine what the 
agreement was. 
We now have the transcript, and nowhere in 
here does it say that we'll avoid Davis. Nowhere in here 
does it establish those bases as Mr. Crandallfs findings 
36 
have set out. 
Now, some of this has been referred to and 
I don't want to be repetitious, so if you don't want to 
hear it, let me know* But when we negotiated this 
aqreement and read it into the record, it was with the 
understanding that the value along with the stepped-up 
basis, the depreciation and the sheltering of the income, 
based on other items, the $160,000 note, the two duplexes, 
and the home be awarded to her, along with the furniture 
and so forth. 
Now, that was a change in the position we 
had advocated to the Court in asking for approximately 
2.4 to 2.6 million dollars of assets, of real property, 
one being the 1.6 million dollar complex as indicated to 
you before. It would make no sense for us to back away 
from that type of a demand without some reason. The reason 
being sheltering of the income, the stepped-up basis, and 
the fact that she would be the entrapreneur she wanted to 
be. Davis was the case at hand and the law of the land, 
and everybody knew that and everyone knew this was a 
premarital asset. 
I think that one of the exhibits that's 
been received was a summary sheet of Mrs. Home, clearly 
indicating the dates that those things were constructed, 
namely, one-half in 1961 and one-half in 1968. The parties 
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were married, I think, in 1969 or 1970. 
That was clear on its face, and the evidence 
before the Court was that this was a situation -- in fact, 
Mr. Crandall's cross-examination clearly pointed out that 
it was a premarital asset that he brought in. Now, this 
was in cross-examination of Mrs. Home. 
For us to take that, with the Davis case beinjg 
the law of the land, can only indicate that there would be 
a tax consequence to everybody. We clearly read it into 
the record in some of the discussions we had, and in going 
through this transcript there are two places in the 
transcript where taxes are mentioned, one being the earlierj 
discission we had on the attorneys' fees which Mr. Gustin 
quoted, and the second one where taxes were discussed, 
about Mr. Home holding her harmless from any joint filing 
that occurred, the last filing being 1981. 
Clearly, we discussed the award to her of 
Townhouse Court, the deposits, rentals, and appliances. 
If there was any indication that there was to be something 
different with regard to 'capital gains, it should have been| 
stated in the record.^ It wasnft stated in the record, and 
the reason why is because that wasn't the intent. We 
knew and they knew that they would have to pick up the 
tax consequences. 
As I indicated to Mr. Crandall, it was 
38 
either that you pay the amount of the tax consequences or 
a greater sum of money, or you pay the government. They 
•%fi •gpj* * » W •«*•£, «^jg5 
chose the gQvermnent and so we took less for that, and 
we relied upon that. Then they came out and they gave us 
a $5,000 check that they were supposed to do, and Mrs. Hornje 
has assumed the running and the maintenance and the repair 
and the putting new people in Townhouse Court, because 
there were vacancies. They have performed and they knew 
what was happening. 
Maybe just something else here. When we 
left this courtroom, within days of that decision 
Mr. Cra.xdall had our proposed findings and conclusions and 
decree. Two weeks later he was able to respond and I took 
a look at them, we made some minor changes that he 
requested, and then we submitted those papers. It was 
only during that last two-week period that this trouble 
started to arise and those differences and disecrepancies 
came in. And it was after Mr. Crandall said he needed 
additional time to research the tax law and determine how 
to do what we were trying to do, i.e., minimize the taxes, 
not avoid them. There's no way you could avoid capital 
gains on Townhouse Court, because it was premarital. 
They knew it and we knew it. That's why we didn't ask for 
Townhouse Court. 
We were asking for Townhouse Villa, and we 
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 ' were asking for — 
2
 I THE COURT: Which was also worth more money? 
MR. LIAPIS: More money, and that was the 
basis for the consideration for us stepping down, and 
5
 why would we come down? I mean, if you had gone into 
6
 I chambers and you had flat out told us, "Ifra going to make 
an award and that's all you're going to get, and Ifm 
8
 ready to rule," then we might back away. There was no such 
9
 J ruling. The case was only in its second day, and we had 
blocked out four days of trial for this case. You had 
only heard Mrs. Horne, and no one else. Well, there may 
12 I have been one or two smaller witnesses who we called. 
13
 Mr. Home was next scheduled to take the 
14
 stand and then we had Mr. Thronsen and Mr. Travis to 
15
 I come forth. 
Why would we back away? Why would we reduce 
17
 I our position to take something less? Now, we had 
18 [
 estimated the estatewas $6 million or more. Why would we 
19
 I take a million eight and take that type of a settlement 
on an estate of $6 million or more? The difference was 
in the value of Home Construction Company, and how much 
of that was really premarital and how much wasn't, and 
23
 I how much more you give us. But the marital estate 
16 
20 
21 
22 
24 
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acquired was between six and eight million dollars, as we 
figured it, and there's got to be some consideration for 
40 
1
 us taking the lower figure, and it had to be that, 
2
 I coupled with the fact that it was a premarital asset 
belonging to M^^ito&£kfe^_-^^C^img^^f.^SL tfrSf ftfl , 
Everyone knew about it, and now what is happening is that 
M r
 • Hornedo-^ 
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capital gain. There's no way out of it. There's no way 
7
 I anyone can avoid it. 
8
 One of the reasons we're asking for this 
9
 I finding to be nunc pro tunc is the state of the law with 
regard to the nunc pro tunc. The research that we've 
been able to do, 24Am .7nr\2d under divorce and separation, 
12 I Section 425, basically provides that as a general rule 
13 J the Court has the power, in fact the duty, to amend the 
record of a judgment so that the record will speak the 
truth as to what was adjudged and rendered as judgment 
16
 | in the cause. 
17
 I And that applies in actions for divorce 
18
 ' and separation. The decree of divorce actually having 
been rendered on a certain day, and that was approved in 
court or in your chambers and read into the record and 
everybody agreed to it. But such date — 
22
 | THE COURT: Have you got the Pr,eece v 
23
 I Preece case from our Utah Supreme Court, which says that 
24 you can't do it nunc pro tunc except to change clerical 
errors? 
41 
MR. LIAPIS: Ifm not aware of that case, 
your Honor. We might have to take a look at that. You 
have got one extremely complicated factor here, and it 
goes right to the heart of what we're saying. If the 
decree is somehow signed, say you take ours and you sign 
it today without a nunc pro tunc basis, the law of the 
land is different from what it was when we bargained. 
f The law of the land now says that there's 
no such consequences imposed by the U. S. Supreme Court 
in Davis. So your signature would go on the decree now 
which is somethina that, number one. was not anticipated, 
it was not discussed, it was not the law of the land. And 
it would be giving Mr. Crandall a back door approach to 
~~ nMtk t ***** ^ ~ v* ' **' ^ ****** 
the position he wants now, but something he never 
....i.«T*n**^ ~-J«I * -
bargained for, nor was it discussed You cannot sign it 
and give it the validity that was intended without 
nunc pro tuncing it back to the date^ripr to the, entry 
of the law, and the law was signed by Pres. Rea9pfl°n tlie 
18th of July. That was the last day he could have signed 
it before it would have gone ...into,..effect automatically. 
So the nunc pro tunc would in fact speak the 
truth as to what was intended. 
Now, there is an ALR citation, 19ALR3d, 
gage 6 52 which indicates that the primary purpose or 
function of the entry of decree, of divorce nunc pro tunc 
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1 1
 is to correct the record of the decree so as to make it 
2
 i speak the truth. That is, the ordinary ground justifying 
3
 J entry of such a decree is that the divorce decree has 
actually been made and rendered previously and the 
5
 I successful parties are entitled to such a decree, but 
6
 entry of the decree may be omitted or through negligence 
7
 or mistake the decree otherwise not been properly entered. 
8
 Now, what we have here is a situation that 
9
 really fits that. We are sitting here arguing over the 
10
 I language and that's all we are arguing over, because the 
agreement is clear as set out in the transcript, and that's) 
really what I was trying to indicate to the Court. 
We had our agreement, we read it into the 
record. The agreement is there, and that's why you called 
for the transcript. The transcript is clear. But it's 
complicated because it's not the law of the land any more. 
Now ve have come from the 2 0th of June to the 8th of 
August, and it has to be nunc pro tunc back to either the 
day of the trial or anywhere prior to the 18th. We would 
ask that the decree be signed as of the date of trial to 
comform to the record, to comform to the minute entry, to 
conform to the order this Court made based upon the 
agreement of parties. 
There's two things that counsel at our table 
have indicated, and I'm sure the Court's aware, but 
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1
 number one, this was one of the matters you bifurcated . 
2
 in the decree which was entered in January. January 24th. 
3
 Secondly, with our reformatting the differences, the 
4
 parties had an option of choosing or not choosing the 
5 consequences, and I wish I had the language. The option 
6 the parties can choose is to have this effective after 
7 or can choose to have it before, and I think that that is 
8 a point that ought to be in the Court's mind. 
9
 But of primarv importance is, what did the 
10 parties bargain for? What did she receive by the 
11 agreement that was read into the record? What was the 
12 basis for that agreement and what was given up or 
13 received by both parties. 
14
 And if the Court would consider those things, 
15 I think that you will see that we would not have bargained 
16 for less. As the Court indicated prior, and thank you 
17
 J tor that, we don't back away from situations when we think 
our client is right. We go for what we think our client 
is entitled to. We did that very thing in this matter 
20 and we knew what we bargained for. We knew that right off 
21 on the stepped-up basis, and we knew what it would do to 
22 shelter the income. In fact, one of the items Mr. Travis 
23 would have testified to was the effect that that would 
24 have on that stepped-up basis, the sheltering of the 
25
 income is what she should do. One of the concerns we had 
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1 was that a certain sum of money would be generated to her 
2 in addition to the $2,000 per month from this notef and 
3 that would allow her the ability to not only be an 
4 entrepreneur, but would give her the ability to make 
5 additional investments somewhere down the road. And that 
6 was explained to her and that was the premise that we went 
7 into this negotiation on. And we wouldn't have done that 
8 unless we understood that was the consequences. 
9 THE COURT: Mr. Crandall? 
10 MR. CRANDALL: Your Honor, I think it's 
11 largely irrelevant to speculate on what Mr. Liapis would 
12 have done and wouldn't have done or why they didn't do 
13 something as a misunderstanding amongst themselves. 
14 I postulate that the reason they settled 
15 for less is that the first day of evidence didn't go as 
16 well as they expected. There would be a lot of reasons 
17 J otner than the tax ramifications as to why they changed 
their deal when we came down to the negotiations. There 
19
 I could have been many things in their mind besides tax 
20 reasons, and it's an irrelevant consideration as to what 
21 the agreement was and what did happen, and I think the 
22 Court is aware of this. 
23 There was a concern expressed from the 
24 I outset of this case as to the tax ramifications to 
Mr. H o m e . The status of the law was Davis, that is, thesej 
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1 !
 transfers of property would be taxable events to Mr. Home 
if some precautions weren't taken. Mr. Liapis has 
3
 ^ k n o ^ d g e d both today and,jLn jt^Jie«in««w&Jiad.A-«Mjpla-| 
of weeks ago when this transcript was ordered.that there 
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5
 I was an agreement ordered minimizing tax impact. 
' Now, the difference as I see it was the 
7
 ' agreement to minimize the tax aspect to Mr. Home, and 
8
 I Mr. Liapis says it was to minimize the tax impact to the 
-» 4KVJ.MK - t&~ i(i-M 
9
 I parties. There is no dispute, both from Mr. Liapis a, 
10 
11 
from myself that the bottom line is there was an agreement 
"* ~~ >JT»-^** *" *** * * * * '*<**n_ *,** •.»*.„, i in -rr "—nrr— H I H I n im—ii.i.uiLrtwrw •irMMlH— r-TlM>aB*ay,*CTt im '*>1 
to minimize the tax impact. I suggest to the Court that 
St*. ^^ftWWt 
definitely through the natural concern of my client, 
the tax ramifications were largely on his part and we wer 
the ones pushing for that concession. 
* In looking into Davis we determined there 
was a way around Davis, and in fact this was raised by 
«w «•*? war* * rflKOVffffia* a ^ ^ ^ n s «»&B**!a11^ 
the other counsel when they said that it would be difficult] 
making these transfers because of Davis. We said that 
there are ways around Davis, that we had researched that 
.... . . . . - * _ - •,„ ' _ _ •• m i — f f . a n i h . * - ' 
-FT MH 9 W » 
before this settlement agreement was made, contrary to 
Mr. Liapis!s suggestion, and we were aware of the language 
that could be contained in the findings that would help 
us in that regard. And that is that it's a joint marital 
g H ^ l W "**"• J*"-— U it I •«> I a | 
property and it's an equal division of such. And that 
avoids Davis. 
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We prepared for that and we said okay, we'll 
cooperate in putting that language in the findings. 
Mr. Liapis suggests that we took a long time on the decree. 
In about ten days he prepared the findings and I contacted 
Mr. Richer and I think Mr. Richer will verify this, and 
said, "How are the findings coming?" He said they had 
gone through several drafts, that Paul had the final word. 
WBS_ 
I indicated this in conversation with Mr. Richer, since 
Mr. Richer wasn't sure what this meant in terms of the 
tax language or at least thought it might have been a trust) 
agreement or something like that. 
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1
 Perhaps Mr. Liapis and the Court will 
2
 recall the Court's opening questions when he said, "Well, 
3
 last week you were in here arguing that there was no 
4
 meeting of the minds.11 
5
 I Now he's arguing that there is, and I think 
that at the very bottom — the very bottom — there is no J 
7
 meeting of the minds. There is an agreement that it was i 
8
 to minimize the tax impact, and the parties are here I 
9
 J saying, yes, it is supposed to be the stepped-up basis, 
and, no, it is not the stepped-up basis. There is nothing i 
specific as to how we were going to minimize that tax 
12
 impact, because in my view there was only one way. There'd 
i 
13
 I no partial step-up basis or any of that sort of situation, i 
i 
Mr. Liapis says he didn't understand it \ 
that way. But there was no question, both out of my mouth j 
and the mouth of Mr. Liapis, that thexa wa« an agreement 
to minimize tax: impact. Now the parties are sitting here 
without help from any records as to how are we going to 
do that. 
I think the Court cannot enter a decree 
nunc pro tunc to avoid the new tax law on the basis of tha 
record and those statements. If it can't enter the decree 
as it is formed now, this date, even Mr. Liapis's own 
decree, although we do have some minor exceptions to that, 
aside from taxes, then it can enter none. 
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THE COURT: Do you want to try the whole 
thing over again? 
MR. CRANDALL: I don't, but Ifm just saying 
that I am certainly opposed to allowing Mr. Home to 
suffer the tax gains on the entire basis right now. The 
reason again, and I might add, the reason why we are 
concerned about it, we don't have an opportunity to tax 
plan. It's just wham, it's everything and we get taxed 
the whole bundle right now. 
Mrs. Home has an opportunity to do some 
tax planning, because other than the depreciation aspect, 
the taxable gain doesn't come to her, if ever, until she 
sdxls the property, and she can structure an installment 
sale or an exchange to avoid taxes all together. 
MR. LIAPIS: Well, it would be long-term 
capital gain versus ordinary income. 
MR. CRANDALL: Well, that's right, but the 
long-term capital gains would be all payable this year. 
We have made calculations and we are prepared to testify 
that it might result in a $220,000 tax liability to him. 
MR. LIAPIS: I was trying to recall the 
language with regard to the tax reformatting and the 
transfer, and Mr. Wade has a booklet on the Tax Reform Act 
of 1964 which indicates that: 
"The property transfer changes are effective 
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1
 for all transfers after the date of enactment. However, jjj 
I the transfer is made under an instrument in effect on or 
before the date of enactment, the new law _does not_^apply 
unless both spouses or former spouses elect to make the 
nontaxable treatment apply. In addition, both spouses, 
by a joint election, can elect nonrecognition treatment 
for all transfers made after December 31, 1983." 
My point is, that the real reason there's a 
need for the nunc pro tunc is to conform to what they 
bargained for, what they settled for, and I'm sure, as I 
indicated before, we would not recommend settlement to our 
client if something was not appropriate. There had to 
be some reason for us to back away from our original demand, 
and to be awarded — 
THE COURT: The other reason is that I 
called both of you into chambers after two days of trial 
and indicated that premarital property went with the 
original owner under the Preston case, together with its 
appreciation, and that concept of appreciation under the 
set of facts in this case was kind of a hodgepodge and 
would be difficult to unwind and unsnarl and figure out, 
didn't I? Isn't that what I basically said? That may hav^ 
been some additional impetus or reason for you to settle 
the case. 
MR. LIAPIS: One other thing, your Honor, I 
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1 would like to get to. Let's assume that his capital gains 
2 taxes are excessive and there has been minimal impact on 
3 us. But we have $10,000 loss per year if it continues to 
4
 be structured like that, and we discussed that, your Honor. 
5 She is not in any position to afford a $10,000 a year 
6
 loss. She hasn't the capital, she hasn't the cash flow, 
7 and she hasn't the assets to secure it. 
8 Now, why would we have bargained for that 
9
 tyPe of situation? 
10 THE COURT: The loss is a non-cash loss. 
11 MR. WADE: It's a cash loss, your Honor. 
12 MRS. HORNE: It's a cash loss. 
13 MR. RICHER: You can't take the depreciation. 
14 MR. WADE: That is a cash loss. 
15 MR. LIAPIS: As a result of not having a 
16 I stepped-up basis for the depreciation and sheltering, and 
tl it's why Mr. Elliott Travis was here and explained that. 
We were discussing it. 
MR. WADE: If I may make just one statement. 
20
 If the capital gains would be $224,000 at a 50 per cent 
21
 tax bracket, which is maximum, that would make it. 
22 THE COURT: That's not what I said. 
23 MR. WADE: That is what he said. 
24 J THE COURT: Well, the property was $1,625,000) 
and if you fully depreciated your — 
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1
 MR. CRANDALL: There are three pieces of 
2 property we're talking about here. We're not just talking 
3
 about Townhouse Court, we're talking about a piece of land, 
4
 we're talking about — 
5
 THE COURT: What is the depreciated basis? 
6
 That's what we're talking about, is Townhouse Court. 
7
 MR. LIAPIS: It's two twenty. 
8 THE COURT: So deducting two twenty from 
9 eighty, you've got $600,000. So you've got a long-term 
10 capital gain of $600,000; is that about right? 
11 MRS. HORNE: We can't count the land. 
12 THE COURT: I understand that. 
13 J MR. LIAPIS: We're talking about eight twenty) 
five less two twenty, and computing that on 40 per cent 
15 I of ordinary income — or 60 per cent, you get a breakdown 
16 I of about a 20 per cent consequence, your Honor. I don't 
think itfs as great as what they're saying. 
THE COURT: That's what I was trying to get 
through, to figure out. 
MR. CRANDALL: We're talking also about a 
piece of property that was given on 13th East. That was 
22
 | our overall settlement calculation. That's a zero basis 
23
 I property there. 
24
 I THE COURT: The basis, including the land, 
25
 is $220,000. 
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1 MR. CRANDALL: On Townhouse? 
2 THE COURT: Yes. How much is the basis of 
3 the land? 
4
 MR. HORNE: Somewhere near $24,000. It's 
5 depreciated about 50 per cent. 
6 THE COURT: You have got a $625,000 gain? 
7 MR. HORNE: Yes. 
8 MR. LIAPIS: There was one other point, and 
9 now all of a sudden we're hearing for the first time that 
10 we have the 6715 South property that we have got to 
11 depreciate or that we have got to take the capital gains. 
12 We've never heard that before. That's never been raised^ 
13 I wovCd argue at this point that what we are doing now is 
14 seeing an expansion of what — you might say — how can I 
15 say this, you are hearing a new issue at this point. It's 
16 J after the fact. They knew about it then and all of a 
suuden we've got it now. I think that takes away from 
the credibility of this argument. 
MR. CRANDALL: It's not our finding. We 
don't have anything in your findings. The only place we 
put it is on Townhouse, which is what we asked for in 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 | it is impossible to speculate the reasons why Mrs. Home 
did one thing or another, why she agreed on one deal or 
another. My only response to that is that your position 
24 
25 
I 
the stipulation or settlement. The second thing, again, 
63 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
is that we wanted the tax benefit because we felt we were 
giving her more than we needed to anyway. 
THE COURT: The Court's order will be that 
I'll enter the findings, conclusion and decree without 
regard to any tax language at all, sj.mj?ly a division of the; 
assets nunc pro tunc to J_une__20_, 1984. 
MR. LIAPIS: Thank you. 
MR. GUSTIN: We'll strike the pleading that 
was filed? 
THE COURT: Do you object to its being 
stricken? 
MR. WADE: No objection. It probably hasn't 
even landed in the court's file. 
THE COURT: Any objection to me turning over 
the original? 
MR. WADE: No. 
MR. CRANDALL: In terms of time for appeal, 
if you enter a nunc pro tunc order I might be out of time 
on appeal. I would request the right to have an additiona]| 
30 days from today — from that order to appeal it. I 
don't know how that works. Maybe this order is the one — 
THE COURT: There should be a provision on 
the bottom of the order. It is signed August, or whatever 
date you get it in your machine, so get it in there and 
get that added. Nunc pro tunc to June 20, 1984. The 
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1 !
 Preece case says we can't nunc pro tunc, which has created 
2
 common law marriage by operation of law, because one of 
3
 J the early experiences I had as a judge was that I had a 
decree and findings submitted for Judge Crockett for 1941. 
5
 J And I've only been here for five years, so that's the 
6
 oldest one I've seen. But I've seen some that are very, 
7
 J very old, two and three years. In the Preece case the 
court said we can't do it and there's got to be a lot of 
9
 I bigamy going on out there if that's good law. But that's 
10
 I what the Supreme Court says. 
11
 I However, that case involves a widow rather 
12
 | than a divorced wife. That statute has been amended that 
* • 
k. <— 
says if good cause is shown that — well, I was looking 
for it and it isn't in the supplement. It was the last 
legislature. 
So you ought to find that. There ought to 
be % specific finding that I think there is good cause 
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shown that I enter the order without regard to the tax 
:QUsequences as it was indicated on the record, and if it 
had been timely submitted, whatever the tax law was, I 
wasn't clearly informed what it was, I didn't know what 
it was, and I'm still not sure I understand what it is. 
MR. CRANDALL: I take it then that the 
Court would not entertain the language of this being an 
order to transfer joint marital property to equalize the 
65 
marital estate which is indicated in the transcript? 
THE COURT: No. I think I just put language 
in there of what the particular assets are that are 
transferred. 
MR. CRANDALL: But Mr. Liapis's statement 
was that it would be transferred to her as an exchange 
equalizing the marital assets of the parties in this 
matter. 
THE COURT: I don't think that was intended 
as a term of art, particularly. 
MR. LIAPIS: All we have done in the 
findings — I'm only asking this for guidance — we 
basically said that plaintiff should be awarded the 
following parcel of property, and then in subparagraph 4 
we defined Townhouse Court 1.1 acres and so forth, and 
indicated that plaintiff will assume the mortgage payment, 
the taxes, the mortgage balance of approximately two 
ninety-eight, pay the property taxes, that they would 
transfer all reserves. 
I would urge that we ought to leave that 
language as it is, since it doesn't say anything about 
a valuation, a basis or — 
THE COURT: I don't want any language in 
there on basis or stepped-up basis or — 
MR. LIAPIS: I'm saying that we do< not have 
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any such language. So I think that since Mr. Crandall is 
here, he could take a quick gander at it. I don't think 
there's anything that needs to be changed. 
MR. CRANDALL: There are a number of smaller 
items, such as the repairs on one of the air conditioners, 
but I would like the opportunity and I would like to take 
a quick gander, given the posture of this case, and I 
would like at least the opportunity to approve as to form 
some of these smaller items that we disagree on and that 
are not before the Court today. 
MR. LIAPIS: I don't want to foreclose him 
on that. I'm just trying to say that with respect to the 
major items that we have drafted in paragraph A-4, there's 
nothing in it by way of basis, there's nothing by way of 
value, and I think there's nothing wrong with the language 
in it, in accordance with your ruling. And unless you 
have anything particular, we'll let that stand and go on 
to deal with other things. 
THE COURT: The Court doesn't strike any 
values on any of the property. None were really intended 
to be valued, 
1 Mr. Crandall for approval as to form. 
2 MR. LIAPIS: Thank you. 
3 THE COURT: And I think that because of the 
4 nunc pro tunc feature, if you'll come in I'll as least 
5 find the Preece case and find the statutory reference. 
6 The Preece case says that we can't nunc pro tunc. The 
7 statute is subsequent to this divorce involved, and 
8 Justice Stewart articulated that we did have a statute and 
9 the Supreme Court ought to be practical about it and not 
10 do as they did. 
11 But at least I can give you the reference 
12 on that case. 
13 MR. LIAPIS: All right. 
14 THE COURT: So there ought to be a finding 
15 added that J find that under the circumstances I had no 
16 intention or didn't conclude one way or another on the 
17 record what the tax effects were or weren't, and it was 
18 entered on that basis, the tax law being what it was, and 
19 the order ought to be entered effective as of that date. 
20 MR. LIAPIS: Thank you, your Honor. 
21 [Whereupon, at the hour of 3:40 p.m., the 
22 proceedings were concluded.] 
23 -ooOoo-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo-
DAWN W. HORNE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
W. REID HORNE, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. D 80-668 
Judge Rigtrup 
ooOoo 
This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 19th 
and 20th days of June, 1984, before the Honorable Kenneth 
Rigtrup, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court, 
Plaintiff, DAWN W. HORNE, appearing in person and by and through 
her attorneys, Paul H. Liapis and Arnold Richer, and Defendant, 
W. REID HORNE, appearing in person and by and through his 
attorney, Richard K. Crandall, and the Court having taken 
testimony and during the second day of trial having been advised 
by counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant that the parties had 
reached a verbal stipulation and agreement, and said agreement 
having been read into the record in the presence of Plaintiff and 
Defendant, and Plaintiff and Defendant having confirmed said 
agreement, and Defendant having agreed to withdraw his pleadings, 
and the Court having already entered the Decree of Divorce on the 
27th day of January, 1984, and the matter having been returned to 
the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Entry of Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order and Plaintiff's Motion to 
Compel Entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order 
of Distribution Nunc Pro Tunc and the Court having reviewed the 
records and files herein and being fully advised in the premises, 
and upon motion of Paul H. Liapis and Arnold Richer, attorneys 
for Plaintiff, does now make, adopt and find the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff was a bona fide and actual resident of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, for more than three (3) months 
immediately prior to the filing of Plaintiff's Complaint in this 
matter. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife, having 
been married on January 17, 1970, in Salt Lake City, Utah, and 
having separated in May of 1981. 
3. No children have been born as issue of this marriage, 
and none are expected. 
4. The Court finds that the parties have entered into a 
verbal stipulation and property settlement agreement, which was 
read into the record in the presence of all parties, concerning 
the division of the property of the parties, payment of eianntarn 
2 
and debts and other related matters, which the Court now finds to 
be fair and equitable: 
A. Plaintiff should be awarded the following parcels 
of real property: 
(1) The Old Farm condominium located at 691 East 
4181 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, as her sole and 
separate property, free and clear of any interest of 
the Defendant. Plaintiff should assume and pay the 
mortgage, property taxes and insurance payments 
thereon. 
(2) The duplex located at 1923-25 Ecst 1700 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, as her sole and separate 
property, free and clear of any interest of the 
Defendant, together with all appliances, furniture and 
fixtures situated therein and all income received 
therefrom. Plaintiff should assume and pay the 
mortgage, property taxes and insurance payments 
thereon. 
(3) The duplex located at 1935-37 East 1700 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, as her sole and separate 
property, free and clear of any interest of the 
Defendant, together with all income, appliances, 
furniture and fixtures situated therein. Plaintiff 
should assume and pay the mortgage, property taxes and 
insurance payments thereon. 
3 
(4) The Townhouse Court Apartments, containing 
1.18 acres, located at 3160 South 200 East, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, together with all fixtures, appliances, 
current and prepaid rentals, deposits, ledger books, 
financial records, the reserve and escrow accounts, 
i£i?ii.idarfrg—Ufam m w uf 02/647.73 leprcaiii Ling frha mnnin^ 
n*"""!^ I I T in j trr n(TnrnM-ft??f,iinf n,irrnnf j nn ishnwr 
-or*. ¥hr nl I ullTTad Prurionfai^ i Fodnrnl Snviftrp nnd^feeen 
a,fffftimnti.n<j irmi^ Hil "Plaiirt'if f' S Enhibife ]>•,—attached 
atp^umnln i ^ y », i i»rM .Mrmnry i"*; 1 ftfl 1
 r and otner items 
directlv associated with this property. Plaintiff 
should assume and pay the only mortgage payment upon 
this property to Prudential Federal Savings as of July, 
1984, with a balance of approximately $297,000.00, and 
should assume and pay the property taxes for the year 
1984. Plaintiff should hold the Defendant harmless 
from the mortgage as of July 1, 1984, and all property 
tax obligations for the year 1984. Defendant should be 
responsible for &*£* payments on the mortgage for the 
A * 
months prior to July 1, 1984, including, 
l imt -mr i i t f i j ' 1 u i - Mmy . mF?" " j ai H I j ' j j j i l ' . l . l , W I N , l a t e 
c h a r g e s ^ The t r a n s f e r of t h i s p r o p e r t y should be 
A in-
e f f e c t i v e Ju ly 1, 1984# arwi t he above l a t a cfaaarga.B an* 
c m ^ i w lunJb uhoulifl be pa id by that- Hftfra, 
4 
(5) The vacant lot containing 1.52 acres located 
at 6716 South 1300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, free and 
clear of any encumbrances thereon. Plaintiff should 
assume and pay the property taxes for the year 1984 
P Slid <~\m DiifmidanL should *-*•-**<**nw *in p1fnntiff Piny^a*" 
rtamyivfefl rndc may hana Loon established for this 
properfeyy but DefmiLLmL iLpieacMLa no wch accountc-'or 
rpsi»i inib •UJIJH;*' lBl^ g*Guun-^  "Initiii that no mortgage or 
other obligation presently exists on such property. 
B. Defendant should be awarded the following parcels 
of real property: 
(1) The Suzy Q apartment complex located at 644 
South 800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, containing .34 
acre, with a mortgage to Prudential Federal Savings in 
the approximate present balance of $53,300.00, together 
with all fixtures and appliances, rentals, deposits, 
reserves and other such associated assets therein. 
Defendant should assume and pay all mortgages, taxes 
and other debts against said property and hold the 
Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
(2) The 5-plex located at 528 Elm Avenue, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, with no mortgage obligation existing 
against the same, together with all of the fixtures and 
appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and other 
associated assets therein. Defendant should assume and 
5 
pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against said 
property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
(3) The Townhouse Villa apartment complex located 
at 3570 South 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
containing 2.64 acres of land, with a mortgage balance 
to Prudential Federal Savings of approximately 
$504,709.74, together with all of the fixtures and 
appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and other 
associated assets therein. Defendant should assume and 
pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against said 
property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
(4) The Townhouse II apartment complex located at 
2250 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, with a 
mortgage balance to Prudential Federal Savings of 
approximately $922,687.00, the same being a limited 
partnership with W. Reid Home and David Home in which 
the Defendant owns 57.5% interest, together with all of 
the fixtures and appliances, rentals, deposits, 
reserves and other associated assets therein. 
Defendant should assume and pay all mortgages, taxes 
and other debts against said property and hold the 
Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
(5) The office warehouse complex located at 547 
West 3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, with a mortgage 
balance to Prudential Federal Savings of approximately 
6 
$199,918.00, together with all of the fixtures and 
appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and other 
associated assets therein. Defendant should assume and 
pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against said 
property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
(6) The rental properties at 62 and 72 Edison 
Street, Murray, Utah, together with all of the fixtures 
and appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and other 
associated assets therein. Defendant should assume and 
pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against -said 
property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
(7) Lot 76, Bloomington Country Club #7, St. 
George, Utah, subject to the Defendant assuming and 
paying any taxes or other obligations owing thereon and 
holding the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
(8) Unit 38 - 414, Snowbird Iron Blossom Time 
Share interest, with the Defendant to assume and pay 
any debts and obligations outstanding and owing against 
said interest and to hold the Plaintiff harmless 
therefrom. 
(9) The two condominiums located at 7833 and 7839 
Honeywood Cove, Salt Lake City, Utah, together with all 
of the fixtures and appliances, rentals, deposits, 
reserves and other associated assets therein. 
Defendant should assume and pay all mortgages, taxes 
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and other debts against said property and hold the 
Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
C. Plaintiff should further be awarded the contract 
receivable for $160,000.00, together with all interest due 
and owing tnereon, and the monthly payments of approximately 
$2,000.00 per month, all associated with the Defendant's 
recent sale of the property located at 4400 South State 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. Defendant should cause the 
conveyance to Plaintiff of all right, title and interest m 
and to said contract and contract receivable with said 
conveyance to be effective on the 1st day of July, 1984. 
D. Defendant should be awarded as his sole and 
separate property the furniture, furnishings, fixtures and 
appliances presently in his possession and under his 
control, his bank accounts and savings accounts, the 33,000 
shares of Challenge Corporation stock, and his personal 
effects and belongings, including his grandfather's sword. 
E. Plaintiff should be awarded as her sole and 
separate property all the furniture, furnishings, fixtures 
and appliances presently in her possession and under her 
control, the 1981 Toyota Cressida automobile, her bank 
accounts and savings accounts and other such accounts, and 
her personal effects and belongings. 
F. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant should be awarded 
any alimony from the other. 
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G, Defendant should be ordered and required to secure 
and maintain at normal and reasonable rates a $100,000.00 
term life insurance policy on his life, with the Plaintiff 
as owner and with the Plaintiff named as primary, sole and 
exclusive beneficiary thereon. Defendant should forthwith 
obtain said policy in the name of Plaintiff, deliver said 
policy to her and make all premium payments thereon. 
H. Plaintiff should be required to assume and pay and 
hold the Defendant harmless therefrom the following 
obligations: The only mortgage payment on the Townhouse 
Court Apartments to Prudential Federal Savings, the mortgage 
payment on Plaintiff's condominium to Prudential Federal 
Savings, the mortgage payment on the two duplexes awarded 
Plaintiff to MountainWest Savings and Loan, the property 
taxes on the above condominium, duplexes, Townhouse Court 
and lot at 6716 South 1300 East, all in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, and any debts she has incurred in her own 
name since the filing of the Complaint in this matter *-trw r*W***w2-/ 
I. Defendant should be required to assume and pay and 
hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom the following 
obligations: All debts and obligations incurred by the 
parties during the course of the marriage/, all debts 
associated with those real properties awarded to the 
Defendant, all obligations that may result from joint tax 
return filings of the parties, and any debts and obligations 
9 
he has incurred in his own name since the filing of the 
Complaint in this matter, 
J. Tim Cam L fiiMJfr fhit thn Plaintiff is employed as 
a registered nurse with St. Mark's Hospital and hao -on 
inrrmna ot bcNeew g7£fl«0n ami ?8Q.Q».Q0 net peg moiMih and aAoo 
has rental income from her two duplexes. 
K. ^ CumL Iimlu thafe-fche Defendant is 
MR-
self-employed t»y W^ R.frfrj Con&truciioi'i Company;"is ila 
majority—&4<?»gfrholdar} and has rental income from the various 
apartment complexes referred to above. 
L. Defendant should be ordered to pay to Plaintiff, 
and has done so in open Court, the sum of $5,000.00, the 
f4 P.. 5 M V K o w n 
same to include the June «anpdNgt payment due under the 
Temporary Order. 
M. Defendant should be ordered to pay to Plaintiff on 
or before the 2nd day of July, 1984, the sum of $15,000.00 
and an additional sum of $5,000.00 in six (6) months or on 
or before the 21st day of December, 1984, 
ic anr1 r mm fa CM • Any.i a d d i t i o n a l f e e s ^ 
* • £ • 
PlaiuLifI'J attorneyfc fooj
incurred by either of the parties, sihrjuid be1 
j$t&*^X&,r\\\ i JTTJ L ir li \\ 
N. Defendant should cooperate in obtaining a Toyota 
automobile or automobiles for Plaintiff at the dealer*s 
wholesale price through the automobile dealerships owned by 
Larry H. Miller. Xt»tt Cumt finds that Plaintiff should have 
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the privilege of purchasing new automobiles at the dealer's 
wholesale price for as long a period of time as Defendant 
has this privilege^! Tha 'usmw* iinds that teho dollar 
p *irhr1 r fir n 1 in prira ir nnt 1 hn t1 pn nr nffrrarl t~n the jttt>*1 
pMhl i/\—but is-rafehor tehe dealer 'c factory cost, 
0. ThiD Court fmrthci finda frhiit 4hould Defendant ever 
obtain any ownership or proprietary interest in any of the 
entities that Defendant sold to Larry H. Miller in November 
of 1981, then Plaintiff should automatically be awarded 
one-half of the Defendant's acquired interest. 
i / R * 
K
 L[ji.]uiind~aC""thati LiiitU diL kuuwu ui wmc Kuuwu a H •* ,.M 
«Toyof ni__ Impogfe i I n c . ,—Laiffliai "Cllu Insu rance Cowpany-, fid 
JRnn9lh»,rn T^y^tn, Tnr , r»lrn ,u rf Mnrvny:—harry M i l l e r ' s 
WftstAirift-Toyotn • (Tniwy Mi l l i ' i TuyuLd u£ PIiumiLK) , LdhflOBi 
^iggooiatoo ,•—Lamioai Manaywriui-rt', Lethdif5T"'"Ai}biPLy , ChJkfrlun 
Motorg i Ltd . ,—Laniinen^ LbtqgUHj , L i m i t c d y and Ldiiy-~miA»r 
P. Defendant should be o rde red t o r e p l a c e t h e roof on 
the duplex a t 1933-37 Eas t 1700 South, S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah, 
a t h i s so l e c o s t and expense . Said work i s t o be done by 
the De fendan t ' s work crew and a t t he s o l e c o s t of t he 
Defendant and i s t o be completed w i t h i n s i x t y (60) days of 
the s i g n i n g of t h i s o r d e r . 
Q. The p a r t i e s should each be mutua l ly en jo ined and 
r e s t r a i n e d from h a r a s s i n g , annoying , b o t h e r i n g or harming 
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one another in any way and at any time, with the sole 
exception that they are allowed to contact one another to 
complete the requirements and the transfer of properties, 
payment of debts, repairs and other items as made necessary 
by this order. 
R. Defendant should be awarded all right, title and 
interest he holds in and to the W.R.H. Construction Company, 
together with all assets and liabilities associated 
therewith, with the same to be free and clear of any 
interest of the Plaintiff. 
S. Defendant should further be granted a right of 
first refusal should the Plaintiff ever place any of the 
above properties, excluding the Old Farm condominium, 
awarded to her for sale, with said right to be exercised i 
writing within three (3) business days of receipt of the 
offer of purchase from the Plaintiff's prospective buyers. 
T. The parties should each be ordered to do and 
perform all the matters and things required by each of tnerr 
to be done herein, and they should effectuate and carry 
forth the agreement expressed herein. 
U. The parties further agree that all property, 
assets and other items which have been acquired during this 
marriage have been fully declared and distributed by this 
Agreement and that no other assets or properties exist. 
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5. The Court finds that with the recent unexpected change 
in the tax laws that good cause exists to grant Plaintiff's 
Motion to Compel Entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Order Nunc Pro Tunc as of June 20, 1984. The court further 
finds that the Defendant was given proper notice of such Motion. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
adopts its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The verbal stipulation and property settlement 
agreement presented to the Court and more fully reflected in the 
foregoing Findings of Fact, concerning division of the property 
of the parties, payment of support, payment of the debts and 
obligations of the parties, and other matters, as more 
specifically set forth above, should be ratified, approved and 
confirmed in all particulars, and the same is to be embodied into 
the Order of Distribution of Real and Personal Property, Payment 
of Debts, Support, Attorney's Fees and Other Related Matters to 
be entered herein. 
2. It is hereby ordered that the final judgment of divorce 
which has this day been signed by the Court be filed and entered 
Nunc Pro Tunc to be of record as of June 20, 1984, that being the 
date when the judgment could have been signed, dated, filed and 
entered. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
That judgment be entered accordingly. 
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DATED this tff -"day of August, 1984 
BY THE COURT 
^EN^ETH RIGTRl 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
RICHARD K. CRANDALL 
Attorney for Defendant 
By -&^Ll ^'<-i-n 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was hand-
delivered to Richard K. Crandall, Esq., 10 Exchange Place, 11th 
Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110, this /£> "day of August, 
1984. 
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PAUL H. LIAPIS 
ARNOLD RICHER 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 532-6996 
AUG 17 1984 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
DAWN W. HORNE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
W. REID HORNE, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISTRIBUTION OF 
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY, 
PAYMENT OF DEBTS, SUPPORT, 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND OTHER 
RELATED MATTERS 
Civil No. D 80-668 
Judge Rigtrup 
ooOoo 
This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 19th 
and 20th days cf June, 1984, before the Honorable Kenneth 
Rigtrup, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court, 
Plaintiff, DAWN W. HORNE, appearing in person and by and through 
her attorneys, Paul H. Liapis and Arnold Richer, and Defendant, 
W. REID HORNE, appearing in person and by and through his 
attorney, Richard K. Crandall, and the Court having taken 
testimony and during the second day of trial having been advised 
by counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant that the parties had 
reached a verbal stipulation and agreement, and said agreement 
having been read into the record in the "presence of Plaintiff and 
Defendant, and Plaintiff and Defendant having confirmed said 
agreement, and Defendant having agreed to withdraw his pleadings, 
and the Court having already entered the Decree of Divorce on the 
27th day of January, 1984, and the matter having been returned to 
the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Entry of Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order and Plaintiff's Motion to 
Compel Entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order 
of Distribution Nunc Pro Tunc, and the Court having made and 
entered herein its written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, and upon motion of Paul H. Liapis and Arnold Richer of 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS, attorneys for Plaintiff: 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
as follows: 
1. Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded the following 
parcels of real property: 
A. The Old Farm condominium located at 691 East 4181 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, as her sole and separate 
property, free and clear of any interest of the Defendant. 
Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay the mortgage, 
property taxes and insurance payments thereon. 
B. The duplex located at 1923-25 East 1700 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, as her sole and separate property, 
free and clear of any interest of the Defendant, together 
with all appliances, furniture and fixtures situated therein 
and all income received therefrom. Plaintiff is ordered to 
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assume and pay the mortgage, property taxes and insurance 
payments thereon. 
C. The duplex located at 1935-37 East 1700 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, as her sole and separate property, 
free and clear of any interest of the Defendant, together 
with all appliances, furniture and fixtures situated therein 
and all income received therefrom. Plaintiff is ordered to 
assume and pay all mortgage, property taxes and insurance 
payments thereon. 
D. The Townhouse Court Apartments, containing 1.18 
acres, located at 3160 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
together with all fixtures, appliances, current and prepaid 
rentals, deposits, ledger books, financial records, the 
rrpFinfii il i 11 IJ I In iiirrnrh—\ nrrrrcayry f n hT"ir^'X th r r^ff inv 
HIM iiiiti cm' Ml IM ill i i HI—Hie dbLdChad~m.'uduiLial Federal 
Sflirmfje frnri T r r n m I i n j inn i l.i 1 "PI n i nl i f f 1 i V li il i I 1 rl , 
attgaghigfl )i'*Fe£^ --a-mI«mage~ a poU^-heiuuI by^ i^ ofororicj^ , any 
^fhPT JiTumAu <i: i: umuldE^ il yinue Jujium v 1, •1004^ and other 
items directly associated with this property. Plaintiff is 
ordered to assume and pay the only mortgage payment against 
said property to Prudential Federal Savings on said 
property, commencing July, 1984, with a balance of 
approximately $297,000.00, and shall assume and pay the 
property taxes for the year 1984. Defendant shall be 
3 
responsible for -sttL payments on the mortgage for the months 
prior to July, 1984, including, but not Aimifcod le», the May, 
t9 8 2 and KpirSlrr-T&to, late charges.T The transfer of this #*~ 
property shall be effective July 1, 1984
 f and ..t-hc pibjwo i a t o 
g h a rSMh£ aa4--LCi0x.v!J¥P»"^ uFiclj> sl ial"! be u a i J M g y ^ t h a f r i a f a . 
E. The vacant lot containing 1.52 acres located at 
6716 South 1300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, free and clear 
of any encumbrances thereon. Plaintiff is ordered to assume 
£e < 
and pay the property taxes for the year 1984, and nAiic 
P^fnntirinf rhn11 tr^nsfpr„ fr.n _ Pi t ; T* i f f nny fnn r nn^rm n '4hi i t 
m ^ y l ^ i > y - h n ^ T W f t g j ; ^ ] i Q H P H _£r^3C_iih i C - p r o p e r t y J fout DQ f Q r w 3 « ? t 
rcprcs^nto* no 3Ug.h""aiiuunti.!i or rooorvca m&e&±. 
2. Defendant be and he is hereby awarded the following 
els of real property: 
A. The Suzy Q apartment complex located at 644 South 
800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, containing .34 acre, with a 
mortgage to Prudential Federal Savings in the approximate 
present balance of $53,300.00, together with all fixtures 
and appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and other such 
associated assets therein. Defendant is ordered to assume 
and pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against said 
property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
B. The 5-plex located at 528 Elm Avenue, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, with no moitgage obligation existing against the 
same, together with all of the fixtures and appliances, 
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rentals, deposits, reserves and other associated assets 
therein. Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all 
mortgages, taxes and other debts against said property and 
hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
C. The Townhouse Villa apartment complex located at 
3570 South 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, containing 2.64 
acres of land, with a mortgage balance to Prudential Federal 
Savings of approximately $504,709,74, together with all of 
the fixtures and appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and 
other associated assets therein. Defendant is ordered to 
assume and pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against 
said property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
D. The Townhouse II apartment complex located at 2250 
South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, with a mortgage 
balance to Prudential Federal Savings of approximately 
$922,687.00, the same being a limited partnership with W. 
Reid Home and David Hcrne in which the Defendant owns 57.5% 
interest, together with all of the fixtures and appliances, 
rentals, deposits, reserves and other associated assets 
therein. Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all 
mortgages, taxes and other debts against said property and 
hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
E. The office warehouse complex located at 547 West 
3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, with a mortgage balance to 
Prudential Federal Savings of approximately $199,918.00, 
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together with all of the fixtures and appliances, rentals, 
deposits, reserves and other associated assets therein. 
Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all mortgages, taxes 
and other debts against said property and hold the Plaintiff 
harmless therefrom. 
F. The rental properties at 62 and 72 Edison Street, 
Murray, Utah, together with all of the fixtures and 
appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and other associated 
assets therein. Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all 
mortgages, taxes and other debts against said property and 
hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom* 
G. Lot 76, Bloomington Country Club #7, St. George, 
Utah, subject to the Defendant assuming and paying any taxes 
or other obligations cwing thereon and holding the Plaintiff 
harmless therefrom. 
H. Unit 38 - 414, Snowbird Iron Blossom Time Share 
interest, with the Defendant to assume and pay any debts and 
obligations outstanding and owing against said interest. 
I. The two condominiums located at 7833 and 7839 
Honeywood Cove, Salt Lake City, Utah, together with all of 
the fixtures and appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and 
other associated assets therein. Defendant is ordered to 
assume and pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against 
said property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
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3. Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded the contract 
receivable for $160,000,00, together with all interest due and 
owing thereon, and the monthly payments of approximately 
$2,000.00 per month, all associated with the Defendant's recent 
sale of the property located at 4400 South State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. Defendant be and he is further ordered to cause 
the conveyance to Plaintiff of all right, title and interest in 
and to said contract and contract receivable, with said 
conveyance to be effective on the 1st day of July, 1984. 
4. Defendant be and he is hereby awarded as his sole and 
separate property the furniture, furnishings, fixtures and 
appliances presently in his possession and under his control, his 
bank accounts and savings accounts, the 33,000 shares of 
Challenge Corporation stock, and his personal effects and 
belongings, including his grandfather's sword. 
5. Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded as her sole and 
separate property all the furniture, furnishings, fixtures and 
appliances presently in her possession and under her control, the 
1981 Toyota Cressida automobile, her bank accounts and savings 
accounts, and her personal effects and belongings. 
6. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant is awarded any alimony 
from the other. 
7. Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to secure and 
maintain at normal and reasonable rates a $100,000.00 term life 
insurance policy on his life, with the Plaintiff as owner and 
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with the Plaintiff named as primary, sole and exclusive 
beneficiary thereon. Defendant is ordered to forthwith obtain 
said policy in the name of Plaintiff, deliver said policy to her 
and make all premium payments thereon. 
8. Plaintiff be and she is hereby ordered to assume and 
hold Defendant harmless therefrom the following obligations: 
The only mortgage payment on the Townhouse Court Apartments to 
Prudential Federal Savings, the mortgage payment on Plaintiff1s 
condominium to Prudential Federal Savings, the mortgage payment 
on the two duplexes awarded Plaintiff to MountainWest Savings and 
Loan, the property taxes on the above condominium, duplexes, 
Townhouse Court and lot at 6716 South 1300 East, all in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and anv debts she has incurred in her own 
name since the filing of the Complaint in this matter^m fycKf^fUi 2 
9. Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to assume and 
hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom the following obligations: All 
debts and obligations incurred by the parties durina the course 
of the marriage/, all debts associated with those real properties 
awarded to the Defendant, all obligations that may result from 
joint tax return filings of the parties, and any debts and 
obligations he has incurred in his own name since the filing cf 
the Complaint in this matter. 
10. Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to pay to 
Plaintiff on or before the 2nd day of July, 1984, the sum of 
$15,000.00 and an additional sum of $5,000.00 in six (6) months 
8 
# • 
or on or before the 21st day of Decemberf 1984, 
& 
k*-
p Ngti-i tLt i f fj q n ti H f rn - y ' flwrf r ~ g apd ^g-f ^ ^ Mini u i u i l i m i d l IILILS 
i n c u r r e d oy e i t h e r of t h e p a r t i e s * s h a l l * b o aocumQd by the -party 
o e c u r r i w y juclr i u 5 l , 
1 1 . Defendant be and he i s hereby o rde red t o coope ra t e in 
o b t a i n i n g a Toyota automobi le or au tomobi les for P l a i n t i f f a t the 
d e a l e r ' s who lesa le p r i c e through the automobi le d e a l e r s h i p s owned 
by Larry H. M i l l e r . The P l a i n t i f f s h a l l have t he p r i v i l e g e of 
p u r c h a s i n g new au tomobi les a t t h e d e a l e r ' s wholesa le p r i c e for as 
long a p e r i o d of t ime as Defendant has t h i s p r i v i l e g e / . The Court f&*&& 
^undorefcandj—l li 11 K •' ^ • 11 Mr f-'hrf3r nn5L~ [ i i i n il • t hn t pv„i rr 
offprpri to fhi- l e L a i l pulrfrrc, buL i s 
12. Should Defendant ever o b t a i n any ownership or 
p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t in any of the e n t i t i e s t h a t Defendant so ld 
t o Larry H. M i l l e r in November of 1981, then P l a i n t i f f be and i s 
hereby awarded o n e - h a l f of t he De fendan t ' s acqu i r ed i n t e r e s t 
immediate ly upon r e c e i p t . 'Phe en^i^-ic^ dLijuirod a t t h a t •-tifflfis-axe 
T'known as II & W'luyotA linpi'JlL, I n c . , LclJH±L'cii Li fe 
-lTVCHtfTK>f'<* ^nmpftny r —Dd S^L^lb^lfirTToyutd"";—Ilic . ,—Oubdiu ei£-"1 
.Tiiltfay Mi 1 1 o r ' n Vfr ~t iw\n Tr- ;nt i—(T. i i I M Mi 1 1 o r Tnyn tn ±\ f PI MM \\r%) j 
T nri1fMi¥ 7^  r r 1— i "if - " T i r r H i n r Mnrnvj rn n ' TTM n ' l - n y ^ ' i ^ r n r y , Sk i r l trail 
Jlototfc/' LtdT, Laiiduai ^uei'/iiMJ , TiimrtFH, and L a n y " w m e f Toyi^a 
t^f B r i l l , IrtlllJll 
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13. Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to replace the 
roof on the duplex at 1933-37 East 1700 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, at his sole cost and expense. Said work is to be done by 
the Defendant's work crew and at the sole cost of the Defendant 
and is to be completed within sixty (60) days from the signing of 
this order. 
14. Defendant be and he is hereby awarded all right, title 
and interest he holds in and to the W.R.H. Construction Company, 
together with all assets and liabilities associated therewith, 
with the same to be free and clear of any interest of the 
Plaintiff. 
15. Defendant be and he is hereby granted a right of first 
refusal should the Plaintiff ever place any of the above 
properties, excluding the Old Farm condominium, awarded to her 
for sale, with said right to be exercised in writing within three 
(3) business days of receipt of the offer of purchase from the 
Plaintiff's prospective buyers. 
16. The parties be and they are each hereby restrained and 
enjoined from harassing, annoying, bothering, or otherwise 
harming one another in any way and at any time, with the sole 
exception that they are allowed to contact one another to 
complete the requirements and the transfer of properties, payment 
of debts, repairs and other items as made necessary by this 
order. 
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17. The verbal stipulation and property settlement 
agreement of the parties is hereby approved and confirmed in all 
particulars. 
18. It is hereby ordered that this Order of Distribution of 
Real and Personal Property, Payment of Debts, Support, Attorney's 
Fees and Other Related Matters which has this day been signed by 
the Court be filed and entered Nunc Pro Tunc to be of record as 
of June 20, 1984, that being the date when the judgment was 
rendered herein. 
19. The parties be and they are each hereby ordered to do 
and perform all the matters and things required by each of them 
to be done herein. 
DATED AND SIGNED this f7 --a ay of August, 1984 and to be 
filed and entered Nunc Pro Tunc as of June 20, 1984 that being 
the day the judgment could have been signed, dated, filed and 
entered. 
BY/THE' COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
vENNETTH RIGTRUP 
Distr/ict Court J*udge 
H. DIXON Hi-vr ..=?.V 
B v M ^gtf/^rr? f/ 
RICHARD K. CRANDALL 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOoo 
Dawn W. Home, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
W. Reid Home, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 860060-CA 
F I L E D 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Orme. MAY1R19R7 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Timothy M. Shea 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeate 
Defendant appeals from the trial court's entry nunc pro 
tunc of an order distributing property incident to a previously 
granted divorce. We reverse the district court. 
The parties were divorced on January 27, 1984. The divorce 
action was bifurcated with the four day property division trial 
to begin on June 19, 1984. On the second day of the trial, 
June 20, 1984, the parties entered into an oral property 
settlement agreement on the record. The record reflects the 
property was to be transferred in order "to equalize the 
marital assets of the parties." 
The court approved the agreement and requested plaintiffs 
counsel to prepare an order reflecting the oral stipulation. 
Defendant's counsel objected to the prepared order as it did 
not indicate the transfer was to "equalize the marital assets," 
language which was determinative as to the tax consequences of 
the agreement. The court therefore set a hearing on August 8, 
1984 to consider the dispute over the tax language. 
The dispute over the terms of the agreement is best 
understood with reference to federal tax law. Prior to July 
18, 1984, taxation of marital property settlements depended on 
the terms of the court's order or the parties' agreement. In 
United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), the United States 
Supreme Court held that a transfer of marital property incident 
-w >^>.vr^ ww nQo o Daxe or excnange, and thus a taxable event* 
Ifi7~a€~71. Thifi^ irapfligfiiLjupDn the tx*nsfeirina_jparty tax 
liability for capital gains on the property_up to the_date_of 
t£g|[gfer, and provided the recipient party a stepped-up basis 
iir-bfee- property IreTTecfTng its value as of the date of the 
transfer* £&£ I.R.C. § 1001. 
In several revenue rulings after Davis, the Internal 
Revenue Service delineated a now well-recognized exception t:o 
the Davis rule: if._the__transaction was an attempt to equally 
Jivxae marital assets, and this was clearly indicated in the 
agreement, thefe~was no taxable event within the meaning of 
Davis. S££ Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26; Rev. Rul. 
¥1-292, 1981-2 C.B. 158. The parties^ dispute over the terms 
to be included in the order relates to whether the agreement 
constituted a tax free equal division of marital assets or a 
taxable transfer of property. 
While the parties were negotiating over the terms of the 
order, President Reagan signed into law the Tax Reform Act of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369. The Reform Act overruled Davis and 
proyiiled^ iJia£jriQ gain or loss will be recognizecLtQ the 
transferojr in the case qfJj;ranisJLej:s oflprgperty incident tc a 
divorce. Further, the Act provided that the basis of the 
property transferred will carry over and become the basis of 
the property in the hands of the transferee. Tax Reform Act 
§ 421 adding I.R.C. § 1041 and amending I.R.C. §§ 1015 and 
1239. Thus, for plaintiff to receive a stepped-up basis in the 
oropeicy she received as a result of the property settlement 
agreement, the order must have been entered prior to the 
effective date of the Reform Act, July 18, 1984, and could not 
contain language that the transfer was to equalize the marital 
assets. 
Also in this interim period a dispute arose between 
plaintiff and her counsel. Plaintiff alleged, among other 
charges of misconduct, that she agreed to the settlement only 
upon heT~~counsel* s representation that she would get the 
st¥pp<ed-~up "basis and his stipulation in court to the" contrary 
was against her instructions. 
At the August 8 hearing, the court considered the charges 
against plaintiffs counsel, the dispute over the language to 
be contained in the proposed order, and whether the order 
should be entered pync pro tunc to the date of June 20, 1984. 
Plaintifl^claimed that unless she received the stepped-up 
basis, the property division was inequitable and unacceptable. 
Deleniant contended the parties1 oral stipulation expressly 
included language that the agreement was an equal division of 
thepa^^s~Tss"ets in or3ef~tnD insure that the transfer of 
property Wis not a taxable event. The record supports 
defendant*! contention. The district court eliminated any 
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reference in the decree to tax consequences'and on August 17, 
1984 entered its Order of property division nunc pro tunc to 
June 20, 1984. 
The effect of the court's ruling was that the transfer of 
property was a taxable event because there was no specific 
language to the contrary, and the plaintiff received a 
stepped-up basis in the property transferred. Plaintiff then 
withdrew all charges of misconduct against her counsel. On 
appeal defendant alleges the court erred in entering the decree 
nunc pro tunc. 
I. 
The court has the power to act nunc pro tunc—to do an act 
upon one date and make it effective as of a prior date. 
Mitchell v. Overman, 103 U.S. 62, 64-65 (1881); Kettner v. 
Snow. 13 Utah 2d 382, 384, 375 P.2d 28, 30 (1962). The common 
law power of nunc pro tunc allows the court to correct errors 
or supply omissions so the record accurately reflects that 
which in fact took place. Kettner, 13 Utah 2d at 384, 375 P.2d 
at 30. Recently, the Utah Supreme Court considered the 
application of the doctrine of nunc pro tunc in a divorce 
action: 
A motion nunc pro tunc is used to make the 
record speak the truth; it may not be used 
to correct the court's failure to speak. 
In other words, the function of a nunc pro 
tunc order is not to make an order now for 
then, but to enter now for then an order 
previously made. 
Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298, 299 (Utah 1984) (citations 
omitted). 
In Preece, the trial court read its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and decree of divorce into the record 
following a trial between the parties. The husband's counsel 
objected to the attorneys' fees included in the proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law but submitted the 
matter to the court for resolution. Prior to the court's 
signing of the decree, the husband died of a heart attack. To 
prevent the wife from receiving a portion of her husband's 
estate, the trial court entered the decree nunc pro tunc as of 
the trial date. The supreme court vacated the trial court's 
action despite the harsh result. 
The Preece court held the entry of the decree nunc pro tunc 
was improper because until the decree was signed the trial 
court retained the ability to alter its terms, which meant 
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there had not been a final resolution of the matter at the date 
of the trial. Specifically, the court stated: 
The determinative factor which prevents 
the use of nunc pro tunc in the instant 
case is the lack of signature on a decree 
and the attendant ability of the court to 
alter the terms of the decree until it was 
signed and entered. Additionally, the 
dispute over the substantive issue of 
attorney fees (in spite of respondent's 
counsel's indication that he would leave 
its resolution to the trial court) points 
to a lack of finality. Because the 
judge's oral announcement was not reduced 
to a signed written decree prior to the 
death of Mr. Preece, a previously made 
order did not exist and therefore did not 
afford the court the right to employ the 
nunc pro tunc device. 
However, even if the oral announcement 
were considered a previous order, nunc pro 
tunc was misapplied here. A nunc pro tunc 
order should be the reflection of a 
previously made ruling. The court had 
orally announced that the decree was "to 
become final upon signing." By making it 
effective as of the trial date rather than 
upon signing, the court altered its 
previous ruling. It did not merely 
reflect its previous ruling. 
Preece, 682 P.2d at 300. 
Subsequent to the trial in Preece, the Utah Legislature 
enacted a statute committing broad discretion to trial courts 
in granting nunc pro tunc orders in domestic relations matters: 
A court having jurisdiction may, upon its 
finding of good cause and giving of such 
notice as may be ordered, enter an order 
nunc pro tunc in a matter relating to 
marriage, divorce, legal separation or 
annulment of marriage. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l (1984). 
In support of his contention that the court erred in 
entering the decree nunc pro tunc to June 20, 1984, defendant 
argues this statutory provision applies only to marital status 
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and not to the property division aspect of'a divorce. Further, 
defendant contends that, even if the statutory language is 
interpreted to deal with issues beyond marital status, the 
statute does not expand the limited use of nunc pro tunc at 
common law as delineated in Preece. Finally, defendant claims 
that, regardless of whether the statute otherwise applies, the 
facts of this case do not constitute ••good cause" for entry of 
the court's Order nunc pro tunc. 
II. 
Defendant argues Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l (1984) is limited 
to matters involving marital status. In construing legislative 
enactments, we assume that each term in the statute was used 
advisedly. West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 
1982). This Court therefore interprets and applies the statute 
according to its literal wording unless it is unreasonably 
confused or inoperable. Id. 
The nunc pro tunc statute expressly states the court may 
••enter an order Nunc Pro Tunc in a matter relating to marriage, 
divorce, legal separation or annulment of marriage.- Utah Code 
Ann. § 3Q-4a-l (1984) (emphasis added). By its wording, the 
statute applies to any and all matters relating to divorce 
proceedings. Had the Legislature intended the statute to be 
limited to status, it could have easily so stated.1 
Defendant asserts the legislative history of this statute 
demonstrates an intent that the statute apply only in cases of 
marital status, such as where a decree of divorce is prepared 
but not signed and the parties subsequently remarry. The Utah 
1. For example, Cal. Civil Code § 4515 (West 1970), prior to 
its 1^ 83 amendment, stated that upon the filing of a final 
judgment nunc pro tunc "the parties to such action shall be 
deemed to have been restored to the status of single persons as 
of the date affixed to such judgment.H Id.(emphasis added). 
See In Re Marriage of Frapwell, 53 Cal.App.3d 479, 485, 125 
Cal. Rptr. 878, 881 (1975) (where no second marriage was 
involved, entry of a divorce decree nunc pro tunc was 
inappropriate). 
Similarly, the Washington statutory scheme allowing for 
entry of final divorce decrees nunc pro tunc contains limiting 
language that upon entry of such decree, "the parties to such 
action shall be deemed to have been restored to the status of 
single persons as of the date affixed to such judgment.- Wash. 
Rev. Code Ann. § 26.09.290 (1973) (emphasis added). See Pratt 
v. Pratt, 99 Wash. 2d 905, 665 P.2d 400 (1983) (entry of decree 
nunc pro tunc proper only when necessary to validate a 
subsequent marriage). 
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Supreme Court has frequently stated that in construing 
legislative enactments, courts must give effect to the 
Legislatures underlying intent. See, e.g., Millet v. Clark 
Clinic Corp.. 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980), 
The legislative history indicates the bill was passed 
"because there have been a number of cases of obvious injustice 
that could be corrected by the entry of nunc pro tunc decrees 
by the court." Tr, of 3rd Reading of House Bill 218, Jan. 27, 
1983# comments of Rep. Lorin Pace. Representative Pace, 
sponsor of the Bill, gave a variety of diverse examples wherein 
entry of an order nunc pro tunc might be appropriate including: 
where the parties, believing they were divorced/ entered into 
subsequent marriages (status); where a death occurred after a 
divorce proceeding had been heard but before the order had been 
filed (status incident to property division); and where there 
was a clerical error in filing the divorce papers (status 
and/or property division). I£. The legislative history 
includes examples of both status and property division problems 
which demonstrate a need for the legislation. Furthermore, 
the legislative history reveals an intent to give the courts 
broad discretion to enter orders nunc pro tunc in domestic 
proceedings where an obvious injustice would otherwise result. 
Our review of the statutory language and legislative 
history of Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l (1984) reveals no intent on 
the part of the Legislature to limit the scope of the nunc pro 
tunc statute only to cases involving the marital status of the 
parties. 
III. 
Defendant further contends that the statute does not 
eliminate the common law requirement of a previously made final 
order, as discussed in Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298 (Utah 
1984). This contention is contradicted by sound principles of 
statutory construction and by the legislative history of the 
nunc pro tunc act. 
Statutes are not to be construed as effecting any change in 
the common law beyond that which is clearly indicated. 
However, where a statute is in derogation of the common law, 
and is also remedial in nature, the remedial application should 
be construed so as to give effect to its purpose. Terry v. 
Lincscott Hotel Corp., 126 Ariz. 548, 617 P.2d 56, 60 (1980); 
see Marsland v. Pang, 701 P.2d 175, 192-93 (Hawaii App. 1985); 
Cf. Hansen v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 652 P.2d 1332, 1337 
(Utah 1982). 
A literal reading of § 30-4a-l indicates a legislative 
intent to change the standard for entry of nunc pro tunc orders 
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in domestic proceedings from requiring a previously 
made final order as delineated by common law, to 
requiring a finding of ••good cause." As pointed out 
by Justice Stewart in his dissent in Preece: 
The Legislature has recently enacted a 
statute that commits broad discretion to 
trial courts in granting nunc pro tunc 
orders in domestic relations 
matters. . . . All that need be shown is 
Hgood cause." 
Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298, 302 (Stewart, J., dissenting) 
(citations omitted). 
Further, the legislative history reveals the statute was 
remedial in nature. The purpose of the statute was described 
by Rep. Lorin Pace as follows: 
And the reason this bill is before us is 
because there have been a number of cases 
of obvious injustice that could be 
corrected by the entry of nunc pro tunc 
decrees by the court . . . . 
Tr. of 3rd Reading of House Bill 218, Jan. 27, 1983. 
Moreover, the examples given by Rep. Pace during the bill's 
third reading indicate an intent to overrule the common law 
approach to nunc pro tunc orders which was causing "obvious 
injustice." Indeed, Rep. Pace made specific reference to the 
Preece-type situation where at common law, due to a husband's 
death occurring after a divorce proceeding has been heard but 
before the order has been entered, a wife is entitled to a 
widow's portion of the estate rather than the provisions agreed 
to in-the divorce proceeding. Clearly the statute sought to 
remedy the injustice caused by the common law approach.2 
IV. 
Having found that Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l (1984) allows 
the granting of nunc pro tunc orders in domestic relations 
matters upon a finding of "good cause," we now face the 
question of whether the trial court's entry of his Order nunc 
pro tunc in this case was based upon "good cause." 
2. The analysis and holding in Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298 
(Utah 1984) therefore has been statutorily overruled. 
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In defining -good cause" for purposes of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-4a-l (1984), it must be borne in mind that the legislative 
history indicates an intention to give the courts wide 
discretion to prevent Hobvious injustices.H The meaning of 
"good cause" must be determined on a case by case basis, in 
light of all of the surrounding circumstances/ as equity and 
justice require. See Wilson v. Morris, 369 S.W.2d 402, 407 
(Mo. 1963); In Re Estate of Corbett, 203 Neb. 392, 279 N.W.2d 
89, 95 (1979). £f. Wrav v. Folsom, 166 F. Supp. 390, 394 (W.D. 
Ark. 1958); Dalv v. Dalv, 533 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1975) 
(Crockett, J., dissenting in part). 
In the case before us, defendant contends there was no 
basis for a finding of good cause and thus the entry of the 
order nunc pro tunc. The district court expressly found: 
The Court finds that with the recent 
unexpected change in the tax laws that good 
cause exists to grant Plaintiff#s Motion to 
Compel Entry of Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order Nunc Pro Tunc as 
of June 20, 1984. The court further finds 
that the Defendant was given proper notice of 
such Motion. 
If the court had entered its order nunc pro tunc to give 
effect to the parties' expressed intentions prior to the change 
in the tax laws, good cause no doubt would exist. Our review 
of the record, however, reveals the contrary. The agreement 
reached between the parties on June 20 expressly states: -[The 
property] will be transferred to her as an exchange item to 
equalize the marital assets of the parties in this matter." In 
entering the order prior to the effective date of the Reform 
Act, and without the essential and agreed upon tax language, 
the court either misunderstood how critical the tax language 
was to the parties agreement or substituted its own judgment 
for that of the parties, and it misused its nunc pro tunc power 
to accomplish that aim. Furthermore, a fair reading of the 
record indicates that in reaching its decision, the court 
improperly considered plaintiffs offer to drop the misconduct 
charges against her counsel in return for entry of the order 
nunc pro tunc. Such conduct does not constitute Mgood cause" 
for purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l (1984). 
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Reversed and remanded for entry of the order of property 
division effective August 17, 1984. No costs. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
-00O00-
Dawn W. Home, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
W. Reid Home, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 860060-CA 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon Plaintiff/ 
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing in the above captioned matter, 
and the Court having duly considered said petition. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiff/Respondent•s 
Petition for Rehearing be denied. 
Dated this 23rd day of June, 1987. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Timothy M. Shea 
Clerk of the Court 
